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The European Union’s relations 
with the African continent are 
facing distinct challenges, with 
the impact of the Covid-19 
pandemic making it all the 
more evident that the prevail-
ing asymmetry is no longer 
acceptable as we move into 
the future. 
This analysis takes a closer 
look at economic relations 
between the European Union 
and Africa, which for some 
time now have been on a 
downward trajectory, and  
addresses the impact of the 
global pandemic at the same 
time. Additionally, the paper 
outlines the current political 
cooperation between the 
two continents and evaluates 
the EU’s recent strategy pro-
posal. Lastly, the key aspects 
of more comprehensive stra-
tegic cooperation between 
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FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – REDEFINING EUROPE-AFRICA RELATIONS
The European Union’s (EU) relations with the African conti-
nent are facing a distinct set of challenges. Contrary to the 
expectations of both African and European governments, 
the pending negotiations between the partners are now 
being put to the test like never before. The global spread of 
Covid-19 has led to economic crises throughout the 
world – and the African continent is no exception. Interna-
tional organisations, the EU, and African institutions alike 
consider the economic and health crisis to be more serious 
than the 2008 / 2009 global financial crisis. This new eco-
nomic crisis also impacts Europe’s relations with Africa. The 
EU-African Union Summit, originally scheduled for October 
2020 but now postponed until 2021, will be overshadowed 
by the global coronavirus crisis.
There is a significant risk that Africa-Europe relations will 
not attract as much interest as other global developments, 
with the USA, Europe and China too busy dealing with 
their own challenges.
The crisis has shown that the prevailing asymmetry is no 
longer acceptable as we move into the future. Now is the 
time for both sides to work together on finalising the 
much-needed reform packages and to recalibrate Europe’s 
cooperation with Africa. To pave the way for these re-
forms, the EU Commission’s plans for negotiations on fu-
ture cooperation must be overhauled, particularly in relation 
to trade and economic relations, value chain integration, 
and the focus on job creation and poverty alleviation. Last 
but not least, cooperation on the issue of sustainability 
must be adjusted, especially against the backdrop of the 
climate catastrophe, which, besides hindering growth and 
causing job losses, poses a threat to agriculture and food 
supply on the African continent.
The concepts presented by the EU in March 2020 do not 
adequately address the challenges on the African conti-
nent and are not in Europe’s strategic interest. Instead, 
what in fact needs to happen is for the EU to anticipate the 
developments on the African continent and recognise just 
how urgent it is to change course. Whether or not the Ger-
man (and Portuguese) EU Council Presidency along with 
the other Member States and the EU Commission will be 
able to give this discussion the requisite impetus will only 
become clear in the coming months leading up to the 
EU-Africa Summit. 
This paper begins by describing the EU’s current economic 
relations with Africa (Chapter 1), which have been on a 
downward trajectory for quite some time already. The ef-
fects of the Covid-19 pandemic are then outlined in Chap-
ter 2. Chapter 3 looks at the cooperation agenda with a 
particular focus on the new comprehensive EU-Africa 
Strategy »Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa« 
(CSA). Chapter 4 outlines the key aspects of strategic co-




European and African countries are at different stages of 
economic development, with European gross domestic 
product (GDP) more than ten times that of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Africa’s GDP, while recording average annual 
growth of 4.6 per cent over the last 20 years, has not 
grown evenly across the continent. Nigeria and South Afri-
ca have been languishing for a long time and, as a result, 
are depressing the continent’s average economic growth. 
Other countries, such as Ethiopia or Rwanda, on the other 
hand, recorded very high growth (see Figure 1). 
Although average per capita income has been on the in-
crease for the last 15 years, the current trends suggest that by 
2030, around 380 million Africans will still be living in pover-
ty. Most African countries do not converge.1 One of the rea-
sons for this is the lack of economic dynamism. Africa is 
falling behind other continents, rather than catching up, de-
spite its relatively high growth. That said, following the lost 
decades of the 1980s and ‘90s, many African countries are 
now undergoing fundamental transformation. Thanks to ur-
banisation, digitalisation, integration into regional and global 
value chains, modernisation of agriculture and a new gener-
ation of dynamic young Africans, African populations are 
becoming increasingly self-confident. Another harsh reality, 
however, is that in some African countries, clientelist rulers 
have not embarked on the path of modernity and reform, 
but remain focused on keeping hold of power instead.2
1 Africa is becoming more diversified. There are several emerging 
countries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda, as well as a num-
ber of middle-income countries like South Africa, Mauritius and 
Botswana, which are either converging or at least keeping pace. 
Some countries remain marginalized, with low growth and high 
levels of poverty. Many low-income countries are stagnating at 
a relatively low level, which is partly due to the high population 
growth in these countries. The pandemic is exacerbating this situ-
ation and has caused some of the countries that had been making 
good progress to fall behind again. Cf. Kappel, Robert / Reisen,  
Helmut (2019): G20 Compact with Africa. The Audacity of Hope. 
Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: pp. 11-13; available at: https://
www.fes.de/en/e/study-g20-compact-with-africa. Cf. Zeufack,  
Albert G. / Calderon, Cesar / Kambou, Gerard / Djiofack, Calvin Z. /
Kubota, Megumi / Korman, Vijdan / Canales, Catalina Cantu (2020): 
An Analysis of Issues Shaping Africa’s Economic Future, in: World 
Bank (2020): Africa’s Pulse 21: pp. 12-22; available at: https://open-
knowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33541.
2 This paper does not provide a comprehensive economic analysis of 
the continent. For such an analysis, see, for example: Bhorat,  
Haroon / Tarp, Finn (2016): Africa’s Lions: Growth Traps and Oppor-
tunities for Six African Economies. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.
TRADE
Africa currently accounts for less than three per cent of 
global trade (see Figure 2). In 1980, the corresponding fig-
ure still remained at 4.6 per cent but dropped to below 
two per cent in the 1990s, before increasing slightly 
post-2000. This latter development can partly be put down 
to rising export prices as well as increasing foreign direct 
investment (FDI), both of which contributed to increased 
trade. Above all, however, it can be attributed to the high 
demand for raw materials in China.3
The EU is Africa’s largest trade partner, although Africa’s 
share of exports to the EU has been on the decline for a 
number of years now. This shift is mainly due to the fact 
that European countries have diversified their imports of 
raw materials, and other countries – such as China, India, 
Turkey and the Gulf countries – have linked their rise to the 
expansion of their commodity trade with Africa. In 2018, 
trade in goods between the 27 EU Member States and Af-
rica reached a total value of 235 billion euros (32 per cent 
of Africa’s total trade). Africa’s trade with China by com-
parison amounted to 125 billion euros (17 per cent), while 
trade with the USA totalled 46 billion euros (six per cent). 
Trade relations between the EU and Africa, while very 
close, remain extremely asymmetrical: With a total of 
31 per cent of Africa’s exports going to the 27 EU Member 
States and 29 per cent of Africa’s imports coming from 
Europe (including 6.9 per cent and 6.6 per cent from France 
and Germany, respectively), the EU is Africa’s biggest trade 
partner by far. Africa, in contrast, is a market with virtually 
no significance for the EU (imports from Europe accounted 
for 6.6 per cent in 1980, 3.2 per cent in 1990, but by 2019, 
they made up less than one per cent). China accounts for 
11 per cent of exports and 16 per cent of imports. A mere 
four per cent of China’s trade is carried out with Africa.4
3 Cf. Kappel, Robert / Pfeiffer, Birte / Reisen, Helmut (2016): Wie  
Chinas Neuausrichtung Afrikas Wachstum beeinflussen wird, in: 
Ökonomenstimme (23.6.2016); available at: https://www.oekono-
menstimme.org/artikel/2016/05/wie-chinas-neuausrichtung-afri-
kas-wachstum-beeinflussen-wird/.
4 Cf. Abele, Corinne (2018): China agiert in Afrika zielorientiert und flex-
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Source: IMF: Real GDP Growth, List 2020; available at: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDp_r_pCH@afrrEo/SSa/oEXp/oiMp (last accessed on 20.9.2020).
Source: UNCTAD (2020): Key Statistics and Trends in International Trade 2019. Geneva; available at: https://unctad.org/webflyer/key-statistics-and-trends-international-trade-2019 (last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Source: Data from China Africa Research Initiative (Cari), Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (online); available at:  
http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade (last accessed on: 22.9.2020).
Source: Data from Hannah Timmis/Ian Mitchell: Reforming EU Trade Policy to Accelerate Economic Transformation in Africa, in: Center for Global Development (online) (16.10.2019); 
available at: https://www.cgdev.org/publication/reforming-eu-trade-policy-accelerate-economic-transformation-africa.
Figure 1
Real GDP Growth in Africa (annual growth in per cent)
Figure 2
Developing Economies’ Share in Global Trade 1990-2017 (in per cent) 
Figure 3
African Export and Import Shares with Key Trading Partners 2019 (in per cent)
Figure 4
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In 2009, the EU’s exports from and imports to Africa were 
more or less balanced. The European trade surplus was as 
little as 2.3 billion euros (see Figure 5). In the subsequent 
years, both imports from and exports to Africa increased, 
although there was slightly more growth in imports. This 
trend continued into 2012 when the European trade deficit 
reached 25 billion euros, which was largely a result of the 
increase in the price of raw materials. After 2012, imports 
from Africa declined, while European exports continued to 
grow. 2014 was a turning point, with the trade deficit turn-
ing into a 5.1 billion euro surplus. In 2016, the EU surplus in 
commodity trading surged to a record 33 billion euros. 
Growing imports from Africa subsequently resulted in a 
decline in the European trade surplus.
Industrial goods made up the lion’s share of European ex-
ports to Africa, with 77 per cent of EU exports to Africa in 
2009 being manufactured goods (see Figure 6). This 
dropped to 68 per cent in 2019, while the share of primary 
goods rose from 20 to 32 per cent. The declining share of 
manufactured goods was caused primarily by the decrease 
in machinery and vehicle exports as a share of total Europe-
an exports to Africa (42 per cent in 2009, 36 per cent in 
2019). A considerable proportion of raw materials exports 
are food products, accounting for approximately 14 per cent 
of total European raw materials exports since the 1980s.5
5 Cf. Kappel, Robert (1996): Africa’s Marginalisation in World Trade. 
A Result of the Uruguay Round Agreements, in: Intereconomics 31, 1, 
pp. 33-42.
Primary goods dominate Africa’s exports to Europe. Be-
tween 2009 and 2019, however, their share dropped from 
77 to 66 per cent, primarily due to the declining share of 
energy exports resulting from falling oil and gas prices. 
During the same period, the share of industrial goods in-
creased from 21 to 32 per cent. This is largely due to the 
increase in exports of machinery and vehicles from South 
Africa and North African countries.
The composition of exports and imports is also different, 
with Africa exporting mainly unprocessed raw materials 
and agricultural products and the EU’s exports to Africa 
mainly comprising capital and consumer goods (see Fig-
ures 7, 8 and 9). Exceptions here are the North African coun-
tries of Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, as well as Mauritius, 
Kenya and South Africa, which have a more diversified ex-
port structure. Some countries such as Ethiopia and Sene-
gal, for instance, have also successfully industrialised in the 
last few years and are now exporting more manufactured 
goods.6
The data illustrated in Figure 7 clearly show that although 
the EU is a major importer of African raw materials, the 
structure of those imports is far more diverse than in the 
USA and China. The EU exhibited the strongest growth in 
demand for African products with higher added value 
6 Cf. Kappel / Reisen (2019), op. cit.
Source: Eurostat – Comext DS-018995; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Africa-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics;  
(last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Source: Eurostat – Comext DS-018995; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Africa-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics; 
(last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Figure 5
EU 27 Foreign Trade with Africa (bn EUR) 
Figure 6
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Source: Eurostat – Comext DS-018995; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Africa-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics; 
(last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Source: Eurostat – Comext DS-018995; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Africa-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics;
(last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Source: Eurostat – Comext DS-018995; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Africa-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics;
Explanation: Primary goods: food and drink, raw materials, energy; Manufactured goods: chemicals, machinery and vehicles; Other.
Figure 10
EU 27 Export of Goods to Africa by Region (bn EUR)
Figure 8
Structure of African Exports to the EU (bn EUR) 
Figure 9
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products from Africa.7 In 2017, these amounted to 42 bil-
lion US dollars or 37 per cent of total European imports 
from African countries (compared to 11 billion US dollars or 
29 per cent in 1997). US and Chinese imports from Africa 
consist primarily of raw materials and far fewer industrial 
products, meaning European investments have a clear in-
dustrial focus.
North Africa8 is the EU’s largest African trade partner. 
Goods exports from the EU to North Africa increased from 
54 billion euros in 2009 to 76 billion euros in 2019 (see 
Figure 10), which corresponds to an average annual growth 
rate of 3.5 per cent. Growth rates for trade with East Africa 
was even higher (5.7 per cent), closely followed by West 
7 For the following diagrams, see: Eurostat (2020): Africa-EU – Inter-
national Trade in Goods Statistics; available at: https://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Africa-EU_-_inter-
national_trade_in_goods_statistics. 
8 According to the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), North 
Africa comprises Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and West-
ern Sahara. West Africa comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Cap Verde, Liberia, Mali, 
Mauretania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Cen-
tral Africa is made up of Equatorial New Guinea, Gabon, Came-
roon, DR Congo, Republic of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Chad, 
and the Central African Republic. Southern Africa includes Angola, 
Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mo-
zambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Zimbabwe and South Africa. East 
Africa comprises Ethiopia, Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Como-
ros, Rwanda, Zambia, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda.
Africa (5.4 per cent) and Southern Africa (5.2 per cent). 
Goods exports to Central Africa, in contrast, declined dur-
ing this period (2.3 per cent) (see Figure 11).
Figure 12 illustrates the significance of imports from the 
five regions of Africa. Imports from North Africa fell slight-
ly between 2009 and 2019. West Africa, on the other 
hand, recorded the highest growth rate (7.1 per cent), fol-
lowed by Southern Africa (6.2 per cent) and East Africa 
(5.4 per cent). Although imports from North Africa (1.8 per 
cent) did not show such strong growth, they still account-
ed for almost half of all imports from Africa in 2019 (see 
Figure 13),9 making North Africa by far the EU’s largest 
trade partner on the African continent, while East and 
Central Africa play a very marginal role.
France (27 billion euros), Germany (24 billion euros), Spain 
(19 billion euros), the Netherlands and Italy (17 billion euros 
each) were the largest exporters of goods to Africa in 2019. 
The same countries were also the largest importers of 
goods from Africa, with Spain (27 billion euros) taking the 
9 Cf. European Commission (2020): Trade Policy, Countries and Re-
gions. West Africa; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/
countries-and-regions/regions/west-africa/; Council of the Euro-
pean Union (no year of publication available): EU-Africa Relations. 
How do African Countries and the EU Cooperate?; available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-africa/. (last ac-
cessed on 20.8.2020).
Source: Eurostat – Comext DS-018995; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Africa-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics;
(last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Source: Eurostat – Comext DS-018995; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Africa-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics; 
(last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Figure 12
EU 27 Imports of Goods from Africa by Region (bn EUR)
Figure 11
Average Growth of EU Exports to Africa 2009-2019 (in per cent)
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top position, followed by France (24 billion euros), Italy, 
Germany (both with 21 billion euros) and the Netherlands 
(16 billion euros).
INVESTMENT
The African continent remains a peripheral region when it 
comes to international investment activity. While Africa’s 
share in international investment was still around the 5.3 per 
cent mark in 1967, by 1980 it had plummeted to 2.6 per 
cent, subsequently falling to some two per cent by 2018.10 
The importance of foreign direct investment inflows and 
stocks to and in Africa is declining. Investment data since 
the 1980s show that Africa’s declining share of global in-
vestment appears to be of a longer-term nature.
In 2017, direct investment from Europe amounted to 
222 billion euros (capital stock), which was five times high-
er than investment from the USA (42 billion euros) and Chi-
na (38 billion euros). British, French, Dutch and Italian 
companies are the most important European investors in 
the African continent. Over the last ten years, Chinese FDI 
has been on a sharp upward trajectory (see Figure 15) plac-
ing it in fourth position when it comes to inflows after the 
USA, UK and France. China’s FDI stock in Africa is still low-
er than that of European countries, amounting to just 
15 per cent of total European FDI inflows.11 Our statistical 
analysis also illustrates that, although the PRC has become 
an important investor, the gap between the EU and China 
is getting bigger rather than smaller. This is largely being 
caused by the steeply increasing Italian and Dutch invest-
ment volumes, which have compensated for the decline in 
FDI from France and the UK.12
FDI from Europe far exceeds all other investors, with the UK, 
France, Italy and Germany alone accounting for more than 
20 per cent in 2015. Compared with 2009 (19.5 per cent), 
the European share had even shown a slight increase. US 
businesses are effectively scaling back investment. Never-
theless, US companies are still some of the most important 
investors in the African continent (see Figures 14, 15 and 16).
10 Cf. Kappel, Robert (1996): Europäische Entwicklungspolitik im 
Wandel. Perspektiven der Kooperation zwischen der Europäi-
schen Union und den AKP-Ländern, in: INEF Report 17: pp. 13-14; 
available at: https://duepublico2.uni-due.de/receive/duepublico_
mods_00027209; Bachmann, Heinz B. (1991): Industrialized Coun-
tries’ Policies Affecting Foreign Direct Investment in Developing 
Countries, in: World Bank / IFC / MIGA: PAS Research Paper Series, 
vol. 1, Main Report. Washington, D. C.; UNCTAD (2020): World In-
vestment Report 2020. New York.
11 Cf. Eurostat: EU Direct Investment Positions, Breakdown by Coun-
try and Economic Activity; available at: https://appsso.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=bop_fdi6_pos&lang=en. See 
also: Pairault, Thierry (2020): Investment in Africa: China vs »Tra-
ditional Partners« – part 1, in: The China Africa Research Initia-
tive Blog. China in Africa. The Real Story (31.7.2020); available 
at: http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2020/07/guest-post-in-
vestment-in-africa-china.html; Thierry Pairault (2020): Investisse-
ments en Afrique: La Chine et les »partenaires traditionnels«, in: 
pairault.fr. Blog Chine-afrique (23.1.2020); available at: https://www.
pairault.fr/sinaf/index.php/publications/1829-investissements-en-afri-
que-la-chine-et-les-partenaires-traditionnels.
12 Cf. Pairault, Thierry (31.7.2020).
South Africa and China have both also significantly ex-
panded their FDI stocks since 2010 (South Africa: 2.6 per 
cent to 3.5 per cent and China: 1.5 per cent to 4.3 per 
cent), while India has stagnated at two per cent. China re-
corded the largest FDI stock increase with a 23 billion US 
dollar rise in the last five years, more than doubling the size 
of its stocks, followed by the USA with 20 billion US dol-
lars. For the EU Member States listed above, the share of 
FDI in Africa increased by 34 billion US dollars, meaning 
that EU investments have become even more important in 
recent years. The gap between the EU and China and the 
USA in this respect has continued to grow. France, howev-
er, once the most important external economic power in 
Africa, has lost its erstwhile leading position.13
Germany, too, is an important investor in the African con-
tinent (ranking tenth for FDI stocks in Africa). Its investment 
structure differs significantly from the other countries, 
however. The UK, France and the USA invest mainly in the 
raw materials and financial services sectors, while Germany 
is very strongly represented in industrial sectors. Germany’s 
main investment focus is car and auto parts manufacturing 
(see Figure 18). This diagram presents a highly distorted 
picture, however. A significant share of German FDI is di-
rected to the automotive and automotive parts manufac-
turing sector in South Africa. Removing South Africa from 
the equation would deliver a far less favourable picture of 
the sectoral distribution.
If all raw materials investments were taken out of the equa-
tion, Germany would most certainly be in a higher position 
in the global FDI ranking.14 That said, the German share of 
FDI on the African continent is on the decline. It can be 
argued that German investors are particularly active in in-
novative sectors, and, unlike US, French or British compa-
nies, barely invest in raw materials sectors at all. And this 
may well be the case. However, German investors are just 
as poorly represented in the knowledge and technology- 
intensive sectors. This applies as much to the IT and bank-
13 Cf. Kappel, Robert (2016): Holen die BRICS auf? Auslandsdirekt-
investitionen in Afrika – eine empirische Darstellung, in: Weltneu-
vermessung (12.8.2016); available at: https://weltneuvermessung.
wordpress.com/2016/08/12/holen-die-brics-auf-auslandsdirektin-
vestitionen-in-afrika-eine-empirische-darstellung/; also Kappel, 
Robert (2018): Gemischter Satz. Deutschlands Wirtschaftsbezie-
hungen zu Afrika, in: Weltneuvermessung (13.3.2018); available at: 
https://weltneuvermessung.wordpress.com/2018/03/13/gemisch-
ter-satz-deutschlands-wirtschaftsbeziehungen-zu-afrika/.
14 Cf. Heinemann, Tim: Warum halten sich deutsche Unterneh-
men mit Investitionen in Afrika zurück?, in: KfW Research. 
Volkswirtschaft Kompakt 171 (27.12.2018); available at: https://
www.kfw.de/PDF/Download-Center/Konzernthemen/Research/
PDF-Dokumente-Volkswirtschaft-Kompakt/One-Pager-2018/VK-
Nr.-171-Dezember-2018-FDI-in-Afrika.pdf. Cf. Reisen, Helmut 
(2019): Deutschlands Direktinvestitionen in Afrika bleiben niedrig, 
in: Weltneuvermessung (15.8.2019); available at: https://weltneu-
vermessung.wordpress.com/2019/08/15/deutschlands-direktinvesti-
tionen-in-afrika-bleiben-niedrig/. A total of 800 German companies 
are active on the continent, employing approximately 200,000 work-
ers, more than half of them in South and North Africa. Between 
Cape Town and Casablanca, German investments are few and far 
between. German companies are therefore not comparable with 
those from China, the USA, the UK or France, whose investment ac-
tivity on the African continent is of an entirely different scale.
9
Figure 14
US Investment in Africa (bn USD) 
Figure 15
US and Chinese FDI in Africa (Total inflows bn USD)
Figure 16
FDI Stocks in Africa 2010-2018 (bn USD) 
Source: UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2020. Geneva; available at: https://unctad.org/webflyer/world-investment-report-2020; as well as UNCTAD World 
Investment Report for other years (last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Source: Data from SAIS; available at: http://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa (last accessed on 17.6.2020).
Source: UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2020. Geneva; available at: https://unctad.org/webflyer/world-investment-report-2020;  
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Source: Eurostat – Comext DS-018995; available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Africa-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics; 
(last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Figure 13
Average Growth of EU Imports from Africa 2009-2019 (in per cent)
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ing sectors as to the cultural and creative industries, and 
the media and film industry. Germany is also losing influ-
ence in automotive engineering, as Japanese, US and Chi-
nese investors gain ground in this sector. The food 
industry, tourism and the construction sector are not do-
ing much better when it comes to German investment. 
German companies are even lagging behind in the start-
up sector. Here, AfricaConnect and other German initia-
tives are dedicated to promoting investment activity on 
the continent.15
15 On German activities, see: BMZ (2019): Minister Müller startet Ent-




(22.9.2020); Cf. Kappel / Reisen (2019), op. cit.; Kappel, Robert 
(2020): Die Neujustierung der deutschen Afrikapolitik. Universi-
tät Leipzig, Institut für Afrikastudien; available at: https://www.
ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/66470. Cf. Bonschab, Thomas /
Kappel, Robert (2020): Ankündigen und umsetzen – für eine 





Compared with companies from the USA, France, the UK, 
China, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
German investors create more jobs per one million US dol-
lars invested (see Table 1, Figure 19).16 The reason for this is 
that German businesses invest predominantly in the manu-
facturing industry. The large number of jobs created can es-
sentially be explained by Germany’s high level of industrial 
investment in South Africa and several countries in Northern 
Africa. These are all middle-income countries with an emerg-
ing middle class, a relatively diversified industrial structure 
and a comparatively strong manufacturing industry.17 
16 Cf. Kappel (2020), op. cit.; cf. Felbermayr, Gabriel / Yalci, Erdal 
(2016): Engagement der deutschen Wirtschaft in Afrikanischen 
Staaten, in: ifo Forschungsberichte 71, ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut 
für Wirtschaftsforschung; available at: https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/
ifo_Forschungsberichte_71_2016_Felbermayr_Yalcin_Afrika.pdf 
(last accessed on 15.7.2020). The data used here was provided by 
Ernst & Young on the basis of FDI intelligence and give us an ap-
proximate impression of the scale., cf. Ernst & Young (2019): EY 
Africa Attractiveness Report 2019. How Can Bold Action Become 
Everyday Action? EY Attractiveness Program Africa Report Sep-
tember 2019. Cf. Mbaye, Ahmadou Aly/Gueye, Fatou (2018): Labor 
Markets and Jobs in West Africa, Working Paper Series 297. Abid-
jan: African Development Bank; available at: https://EconPapers.
repec.org/RePEc:adb:adbwps:2424 (last accessed on 18.9.2020).
17 See, for example, on Tunisia: Bass, Hans-Heinrich / Kappel, Robert /
Wohlmuth, Karl (2017): Starting Points for a National Employment 
Strategy for Tunisia, Tunis, April 2017. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/
iez/13336.pdf (last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Figure 17
European FDI Stocks on the African Continent 2013-2018 (bn USD)
Figure 18
German Investment Structure on the African Continent (EUR bn)
Source: UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2020. Geneva; available at: https://unctad.org/webflyer/world-investment-report-2020 (last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2019): Statistisches Jahrbuch 2019, p. 450; available at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Themen/Querschnitt/Jahrbuch/statistisches-jahrbuch-2019-dl.pdf?__blob=publicationfile.  
Also: Deutsche Bundesbank: Das Deutsche Auslandsvermögen Ende 2018, in: Bundesbank Pressenotizen (30.9.2019); available at: https://www.bundesbank.de/de/presse/pressenotizen/das-deutsche-auslands-
vermoegen-ende-2018-808406. (last accessed on 18.9.2020).
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China and India have successfully managed to position 
themselves as global networkers. Africa-China coopera-
tion has increased dramatically. At the same time, this has 
broadened the scope for African countries to move beyond 
their all-too present postcolonial dependency. That said, 
we should be cautious about being overly optimistic in our 
assessment of China’s investment activities. The high level 
of infrastructure investment,18 the investment structure 
and the structure of foreign trade, in particular, make it 
clear that this is not a new form of cooperation with Africa. 
In fact, the unilateral focus on raw materials investments is 
aimed at supplying the Chinese economy. Although China 
also invests in industry, the links with local businesses are 
weak, meaning these investments make barely any contri-
bution to Africa’s endogenous growth.
18 Cf. de Meo, Andrea (2020): Political Risk in Infrastructure Invest-
ments in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: Carlo Secchi / Alberto Belladonna 
(eds): Infrastructure in a Changing World. Trends and Challenges. 
Milan: ISPI: pp. 47-56; available at: www.ispionline.it/sites/default/
files/pub- blicazioni/ispi_report-infrastructure_2020.pdf (last ac-
cessed on 20.9.2020). Cf. Felbermayr, Gabriel / Goldbeck, Moritz /
Sandkamp, Alexander (2019): Chinas ausländische Direktinves-
titionen. Ein Überblick, in: Kiel Policy Brief 123. IfW Kiel Institut 
für Weltwirtschaft; available at: https://www.econstor.eu/han-
dle/10419/195069 (last accessed on 15.9.2020).
Chinese companies have invested largely in raw materials 
sectors, such as natural oil and gas as well as copper, iron 
and uranium.19 Chinese firms working in raw material ex-
traction play a major role in Africa’s construction sector. 
The most active Chinese construction companies in Afri-
ca are China Railway Construction, China Communica-
tions Construction, China National Machinery Industry 
Corporation (Sinomach) and State Construction Engi-
neering. Compared to German investments, Chinese 
projects generate fewer jobs per one million US dollars 
invested.20
19 Cf. Germany Trade & Invest (GTAI) (2018): China in Afrika – Pers-
pektiven, Strategien und Kooperationspotenziale für deutsche Un-
ternehmen. Berlin; available at: https://www.gtai.de/gtai-de/trade/
wirtschaftsumfeld/studie/suedafrika/studie-china-in-afrika-pers-
pektiven-strategien-und-46476.
20 Cf. Ernst & Young (2019), op. cit. Cf. African Development Bank 
(AfDB) (2018): Africa’s Infrastructure. Great Potential but Little Im-
pact on Inclusive Growth, in: African Economic Outlook 2018. 
Abidjan: pp. 63-94; available at: www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/
afdb/Documents/publications/african_Economic_outlook_2018_-_
EN.pdf. (18.9.2020). On competition between Europe and China, 
see: Karkare, Poorva / Calabrese, Linda / Grimm, Sven / Medinilla,  
Alfonso (2020): European Fear of »Missing Out« and Narratives 
on China in Africa. Brussels: European Think Tanks Group (ETTG); 
available at: https://www.die-gdi.de/en/others-publications/article/
european-fear-of-missing-out-and-narratives-on-china-in-africa/ 
(last accessed on 20.9.2020).
Figure 19
Jobs per one Million USD of FDI, on Average 2014-2018 
Source: Based on data from FDI Intelligence and Ernst & Young (2019), op.cit. p. 18, as well as UNCTAD (2019): World Investment Report 2019. New York.








Source: Based on data from FDI Intelligence and Ernst & Young (2019), How Can Bold Action Become Everyday Action? EY Attractiveness Program Africa, Report September 2019. 
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/attractiveness/ey-africa-attractiveness-report-2019.pdf (last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Table 1
Jobs Created Through FDI 2014-2018




Jobs per one million 
USD of FDI
USA 62 30,9 2,0
France 58 34,2 1,7
UK 41 17,8 2,3
China 137 72,2 1,9
South Africa 21 10,2 2,1
UAE 39 25,3 1,6
Germany 32 6,9 4,6
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Between 2000 and 2017, China issued 130 billion euros in 
loans to African governments and state-owned enterpris-
es, with the funds being used mainly for infrastructure ex-
pansion.21 According to the China Africa Research 
Institution (CARI), China is now the largest bilateral creditor 
in the region, accounting for 20 per cent of Africa’s public 
debt.22
21 Cf. Timmis, Hannah / Gavas, Mikaela (2019): What Does China’s In-
vestment in Africa Mean for Europe?, in: Center for Global Devel-
opment Blog (14.11.2019); available at: https://www.cgdev.org/
blog/what-does-chinas-investment-africa-mean-europe.
22 Cf. Brautigam, Deborah (2020): China, the World Bank, and Afri-
can Debt. A War of Words, in: The Diplomat (17.8.2020); available 
at: https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/china-the-world-bank-and-af-
rican-debt-a-war-of-words/; cf. Acker, Kevin / Brautigam, Deborah /
Huang, Yufan (2020): Debt Relief with Chinese Characteristics. Cari 
Working Paper 39. Washington, D. C.; available at: http://www.
sais-cari.org/publications-working-papers (last accessed  
on 22.9.2020).
On the question of FDI and the role of foreign financial 
flows on the African continent, three politically motivated 
preconceptions are currently being propagated in Africa: 1. 
China is one of the most important investors in the conti-
nent and is »buying it up«.23 Our analysis shows, however, 
that China’s economic importance on the African conti-
nent is hugely overestimated, whereas the diversity of Chi-
nese activity receives very little attention. 2. Almost all 
investments are in the raw materials and energy sectors. 
However, a more detailed analysis shows that Chinese 
companies have also invested in manufacturing and agri-
23 In 2012, for instance, Die Welt ran an article with the headline: 
»Chinesische investoren kaufen halb Afrika auf« (Chinese inves-
tors buy up half of Africa). Cf. Erling, Johnny / Putzier, Konrad: Chi-
nesische investoren kaufen halb Afrika auf, in: Die Welt (online, 
19.7.2012); available at: https://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/wirt-
schaft/article108338768/Chinesische-Investoren-kaufen-halb-Af-
rika.html; and David Dollar writes: »Since 2000, China has emerged 
as Africa’s largest trading partner and a major source of invest-
ment finance as well«. Cf. Dollar, David (2016): Order from Chaos. 
Setting the Record Straight on China’s Engagement in Africa, in: 
The Brookings Institution (11.7.2016); available at: https://www.
brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/07/11/setting-the-re-
cord-straight-on-chinas-engagement-in-africa/. On China’s role in 
Africa’s growth, see: Kappel / Pfeiffer / Reisen (2016), op. cit. I am 
unable to conduct a comprehensive analysis of Chinese activities 
within the constraints of this paper and as such refer to Brautigam, 
Deborah (2011): The Dragon’s Gift. The Real Story of China in Af-
rica. New York: Oxford University Press.
Figure 20
Chinese Lending to Africa (bn USD)
Figure 21
African Debt 2018 (bn USD)
Source: http://www.sais-cari.org/data (last accessed on 18.9.2020).
Source: Data based on Deborah Brautigam / Yufan Huang / Kevin Acker (2020): Debt Relief with Chinese Characteristics: in: Cari Briefing Paper 3. Washington, D.C.;  































culture in recent decades.24 A trend towards more industri-
al and service investments can be observed. 3. Foreign 
financial flows have played the pivotal role in Africa’s de-
velopment process. This is, in fact, not the case. Local in-
vestment and tax revenues have been just as instrumental 
for Africa’s growth.
In every respect, the EU is an important external actor for 
Africa and has indeed been strengthening its position on 
the African continent rather than scaling down its activi-
ties. The increasing share of European FDI in manufactur-
ing and services, in particular, – along with the diminishing 
focus on the raw materials sector – has enabled European 
companies to consolidate their economic position. Never-
theless, here too, caution is called for: Contrary to all asser-
tions, FDI and trade – and this includes with the EU – are 
not overly effective. They neither generate a large number 
of jobs, though certain high-quality investments can give 
knowledge and technology transfer a boost, nor do they 
make a significant contribution to industrial or agricultural 
development on the African continent. As demonstrated 
below, this is related to the asymmetrical relationship be-
tween the two continents, FDI’s weak links with local in-
dustry and especially with the endogenous dynamics of 
Africa’s economic development, which is less dependent 
on external transfers today than ever before.
24 On this, see: School of Advanced International Studies - China Af-
rica Research Initiative (SAIS-CARI) at Johns Hopkins University in 
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The pandemic and the global recession that came in its 
wake have impacted the development of every single sector 
of the economy in the countries of Africa. A year ago, in its 
Africa’s Pulse report, the World Bank forecast that sub-Sa-
haran African economies would grow by 2.8 per cent in 
2019 and 2020.25 Recent studies show that this target is 
now out of reach, however. The United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA), for instance, expects Afri-
can economic growth to plummet from a potential 3.2 per 
cent to 1.8 per cent in 2020, which is lower than popula-
tion growth. For some years already, average economic 
growth in Africa has been on the decline, amounting to 
just 3.3 per cent from 2014 to 2019 (see Figure 1). 
In the worst case scenario, Africa’s average GDP growth 
could fall by eight to ten percentage points, which would 
result in negative growth of - 3.9 per cent. The World Bank 
reported that the Covid-19 outbreak triggered the first re-
cession in sub-Saharan Africa in 25 years. According to 
OECD estimates, each month of strict containment meas-
ures will result in a two percentage point drop in Africa’s 
annual average GDP growth. That said, it has become ap-
parent that many African countries have responded effec-
tively to the pandemic and, with the exception of a small 
number of countries, such as South Africa, the number of 
Covid-19 cases has remained relatively low.
The worldwide recession has already caused dramatic de-
mand and supply shocks. The result has been extensive 
production and welfare losses,26 with the ILO anticipating 
between 19 and 22 million job losses in Africa. This is par-
ticularly worrying given that just 18 per cent of African em-
25 Cf. Zeufack, et al., (2020), op. cit.; World Bank (2020): For Sub- 
Saharan Africa, Coronavirus Crisis Calls for Policies for Greater Re-
silience (9.4.2020); available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/
region/afr/publication/for-sub-saharan-africa-coronavirus-cri-
sis-calls-for-policies-for-greater-resilience; OECD (2020): COVID-19 
in Africa. Regional Socio-Economic Implications and Policy Priori-
ties, in: OECD: Tackling Coronavirus (COVID-19). Contributing to a 
Global Effort (7.5.2020); available at: https://www.oecd.org/coro-
navirus/policy-responses/covid-19-and-africa-socio-economic-impli-
cations-and-policy-responses-96e1b282/.
26 Cf. World Bank (9.4.2020); OECD (7.5.2020); Cf. Akiwumi, Paul 
(2020): COVID-19. A Threat to Food Security in Africa, in: OECD 
Development Matters (11.8.2020); available at: https://oecd-devel-
opment-matters.org/2020/08/11/covid-19-a-threat-to-food-securi-
ty-in-africa/.
ployees are covered by social protection schemes. UNECA 
further estimates that the impact on African economies 
will push as many as 29 million people into extreme pover-
ty (defined as living on less than 1.90 US dollars per day).27 
Sumner et al. (2020)28 expect up to half a billion people 
worldwide to slip below the poverty line again. This would 
imply an additional 112 million poor in sub-Saharan Africa, 
which would correspond to a 25 per cent increase and 
would cancel out much of the progress made in reducing 
poverty over many years. As Sumner et al. (2020) point 
out, the situation is exacerbated by the fact that 17 per 
cent of African households affected by Covid-19 will face 
at least transient poverty. 
Informal labour29 is extremely widespread in Africa. Infor-
mal workers are at great risk of falling into poverty. Wom-
en are often more vulnerable to the effects of the 
27 Cf. Dabalen, Andrew / Paci, Pierella (2020): How Severe Will the 
Poverty Impacts of COVID-19 be in Africa?, in: World Bank Blogs 
(5.8.2020); available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/
how-severe-will-poverty-impacts-covid-19-be-africa. The authors 
estimate that the increase in poverty will be 13 million people at 
the very least. Depending on how long the pandemic continues, 
these figures may well be substantially higher.
28 Cf. Sumner, Andrew / Hoy, Chris / Ortiz-Juarez, Eduardo (2020): Es-
timates of the Impact of COVID-19 on Global Poverty, in: United 
Nations University World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (UNU-WIDER): WIDER Working Paper 43; available at: 
https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/estimates-impact-cov-
id-19-global-poverty. (last accessed on 15.8.2020). Vos, Rob / 
Martin, Will / Laborde, David (2020): How Much Will Global Poverty 
Increase Because of COVID-19? International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) (20.3.2020); available at: https://www.ifpri.org/
blog/how-much-will-global-poverty-increase-because-covid-19; 
Kappel, Robert (2020): COVID-19. Wie Afrikanische Länder in die 
Krise geraten, in: Weltneuvermessung (31.3.2020); available at: 
https://weltneuvermessung.wordpress.com/2020/04/01/covid-19-
wie-afrikanische-laender-in-die-krise-geraten/; Cf. Sayeh, Antoi-
nette / Chami, Ralph (2020): Lifelines in Danger, in: International 
Monetary fund: Finance and Development 57 (2): pp. 16-19; avail-
able at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2020/06/
COVID19-pandemic-impact-on-remittance-flows-sayeh.htm. (last 
accessed on 20.8.2020). Lakemann, Tabea / Lay, Jann / Tafese, Te-
vin (2020): Africa after the Covid-19 Lockdowns: Economic Impacts 
and Prospects. Hamburg: GIGA Focus Afrika 6 (2020); available 
at: https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/21606562-afri-
ca-after-covid-19-lockdowns-economic-impacts-prospects/ (last  
accessed on 14.10.2020).
29 Cf. Schwettmann, Jürgen (2020): Covid-19 and the Informal Econ-
omy. Impact and Response Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Berlin: 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung; available at: https://www.fes.de/referat-af-
rika/wirtschaftspolitik (last accessed on 20.9.2020).
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pandemic, primarily because of the dominant role they 
play in community-based activities, as the main caregivers 
and as formal and informal healthcare workers, as well as 
their reliance on agriculture and service activities. Millions 
of women’s jobs have already disappeared. The largest 
number of job losses will be experienced in hotels, retail, 
food production and the manufacturing industry. Overall, 
90 per cent of Africa’s jobs are in the private sector.30
The OECD forecasts that African countries’ public debt in 
relation to GDP could rise from 58 per cent (2019) to 85 per 
cent (2020).31 African governments’ external debt is with 
multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and the 
IMF. Overall, 32 per cent of their borrowing is from bilater-
al creditors (20 per cent of which is to China32, see Fig-
ure 20) and a further 32 per cent from private lenders. 
Many African countries were already highly indebted even 
before the Covid-19 outbreak. The external debt of the 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa rose from 236 billion US 
dollars to 583 billion US dollars between 2008 and 2018. 
The current recession simply exacerbates the debt crisis 
and limits the possible courses of action open to African 
governments: in 2020, African countries spent around a 
quarter of their budget revenues servicing debts.33
The changes brought by the pandemic have led to restric-
tions on economic activities within African countries and 
the establishment of trade barriers. Global demand for raw 
materials and agricultural products from Africa has dropped 
sharply. Tourism has come to a standstill. Europe, the USA 
and China are in crisis mode and this has hampered eco-
nomic development in Africa in various ways:
 – The economic crisis in Europe, the emerging coun-
tries, China and the USA is depressing global eco-
nomic growth, which is hitting the low-income 
countries particularly hard due to their dependence 
on commodity exports. UNECA, for instance, has es-
timated that Africa’s total income from exports of 
raw materials could contract by around 100 billion US 
dollars, with revenues from oil exports alone poten-
tially seeing a drop of 65 billion US dollars. As a result 
of their low export diversity, with exports of raw ma-
terials making up a significant share of total exports, 
African countries such as Southern Sudan (99 per 
cent), Chad (92 per cent), Angola (88 per cent), Nige-
30 Cf. EDFI (2020): A Call for Action to European Governments and 
their Development Finance Institutions – Saving Jobs in Africa 
(30.4.2020); available at: www.edfi.eu/news/callforaction.
31 Cf. OECD (7.5.2020), op. cit.; See also: Jones, Alexi / Sergejeff, 
Katja / Sherriff, Andrew / Teevan, Chloe / Veron, Pauline (2020): The 
Challenge of Scaling up the European Union’s Global Response 
to COVID-19, in: European Centre for Development Policy Man-
agement (ECDPM): Briefing Note 116; available at: https://ecdpm.
org/publications/challenge-scaling-up-european-union-global-re-
sponse-covid-19/. (last accessed on 20.9.2020).
32 African countries’ debt to China totals around 133 billion US dol-
lars. Cf. Brautigam (2020), op. cit.
33 Cf. Lopes, Carlos (2020): Africa Must Revise its Priorities in the Face 
of Covid-19, in: New African (22.4.2020); available at: https://newa-
fricanmagazine.com/23167/.
ria (76 per cent) and Zambia (74 per cent) are affect-
ed particularly strongly by fluctuations in demand 
and prices. This has serious repercussions. Due to the 
fact that crude oil exports generate 76 per cent of 
Nigeria’s foreign exchange, the 60-per cent drop in 
oil prices since the start of 2020 to less than 30 US 
dollars per barrel has reduced the country’s export 
revenue drastically. The sharp drop in prices is pre-
dicted to reduce export earnings by five billion US 
dollars (1.3 per cent of GDP) within three months and 
8.6 billion US dollars (2.2 per cent of GDP) within six. 
In fact, Nigeria’s oil exports plummeted by 60 per 
cent in the first half of 2020.34 
 – The price of Liberia’s top export goods iron ore and 
timber have declined, impacting its foreign exchange 
revenues and growth hugely and causing a rise in pov-
erty at the same time.35
 – The drop in the demand for clothing on European 
markets has put clothing exports from countries such 
as Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar and others on a 
downward slope, resulting in tens of thousands of 
job losses.
 – Countries that are better integrated in value chains 
(such as Kenya in flower production or South Africa in 
the automotive industry) have also been severely af-
fected by the pandemic. The Kenyan flower sector has 
suffered major losses in the past six months as a result 
of the sharp drop in demand for flowers. A total of 
500,000 people employed in Kenya’s flower industry 
are reported to have temporarily lost their jobs.36
 – Lockdowns in the OECD countries, China and other 
emerging countries have resulted in a downturn in de-
mand and a further drop in the price of raw materials, 
while reduced imports have caused bottlenecks in the 
supply of certain major consumer and investment 
goods etc.
 – Many export sectors are heavily dependent on the im-
port of intermediate goods, machinery etc. These sec-
tors are now having problems generating the necessary 
foreign exchange for imports.
 – Revenues from tourism (worth a total of 35 billion US 
dollars in 2018) including hotels, restaurants and airlines 
have plummeted, resulting in job losses. The impact of 
Covid-19 on tourism and transport has had significant 
34 On the state of Nigeria’s economy, see: Premium Times 
(23.9.2020); available at: https://www.premiumtimesng.com/
business/business-news/416452-nigerian-banks-still-strong-de-
spite-covid-19-impact-cbn-governor.html. On the development 
of exports, see: Nairametrics (2.9.2020); available at: https://na-
irametrics.com/2020/12/07/nigerias-foreign-trade-hits-n8-4-tril-
lion-in-q3-2020-as-import-rises-by-38/. See also: World Bank 
Data Blog (16.9.2020); available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/
opendata/tracking-socioeconomic-impacts-pandemic-nigeria-re-
sults-first-three-rounds-nigeria-covid.
35 On Liberia, see: More Liberians to Slip into Poverty, in: Daily Ob-
server (4.8.2020); available at: https://www.liberianobserver.com/
news/more-liberians-to-slip-into-poverty/.
36 Cf. Ashley, Caroline / te Velde, Dirk Willem (2020): Vulnerable Work-
ers in Global Value Chains – Ambitious Collaboration Needed, 
in: Business Fights Poverty (20.4.2020); available at: https://busi-
nessfightspoverty.org/articles/vulnerable-workers-in-global-val-
ue-chains-ambitious-collaboration-needed/.
EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON AFRICAN ECONOMIES
16
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – REDEFINING EUROPE-AFRICA RELATIONS
adverse effects on trade in services, while lockdowns 
have reduced the demand for business services.37
 – The lower foreign exchange rates for African oil and 
metal exporters have triggered negative income ef-
fects as imports have become more expensive, causing 
a decline in private and public saving.
 – Reduced foreign exchange reserves adversely affect 
the availability of capital and financing.
 – According to the World Bank, Covid-19 has reduced 
foreign financing flows and contributed to capital 
flight from African countries, leaving large companies, 
factories and SMEs underfunded or non-operational. 
In the medium term, this will reduce local production 
capacities and place more jobs at risk.
 – Remittances from Africans living abroad contribute to 
the income of millions of families and are an important 
source of development finance. These transfers have 
helped alleviate poverty, provide medical treatment, 
finance schooling, promote local businesses and 
strengthen the role of women. Remittances have been 
received to the tune of over 60 billion US dollars since 
2015, making them Africa’s largest source of external 
financing. During the crisis, however, they have de-
clined significantly, a development which has hit the 
low-income and fragile states especially hard. For 
economies and families that rely on remittances from 
abroad, the current crisis means a drop in their in-
come.38 Any decline in remittance flows will also weak-
en ongoing efforts to end poverty, hunger and 
inequality. Compared with the volatile foreign invest-
ment and portfolio flows, remittances are considered 
to be more stable and can even have counter-cyclical 
effects which mitigate external economic shocks.
 – The global crisis is also negatively impacting Africa’s 
tax revenues on various levels. Many countries in Afri-
ca finance their government spending through import 
trade taxes and customs duties. In those African coun-
tries which export raw materials, income from this 
source still made up 80 per cent of government reve-
nue in 2013 and in the oil-rich countries of Algeria, 
Angola, Guinea, the Congo and Libya, this figure 
amounted to 20 per cent of GDP. As these revenues 
have declined, so, too, has the scope for action that 
these countries have. Governments’ fiscal scope may 
be more limited and external borrowing costs would 
37 Cf. Mendez-Parra, Max (2020): Trade and the Coronavirus: Africa’s 
Commodity Exports Expected to Fall Dramatically, in: Supporting 
Economic Transformation (26.3.2020); available at: https://set.odi.
org/trade-and-the-coronavirus-africas-commodity-exports/;  
Cf. Akiwumi, Paul (21.8.2020).
38 On developments in 2020, see: Adikhari, Samik (2020): COVID-19 
is Reducing Domestic Remittances in Africa: What Does it Mean 
for Poor Households? in: World Bank Blogs (9.6.2020); available at: 
https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/covid-19-reducing-domes-
tic-remittances-africa-what-does-it-mean-poor-households. For 
more general information on this, see: Bisong, Amanda / Ahairwe, 
Pamella Eunice / Njoroge, Esther (2020): The Impact of COVID-19 
on Remittances for Development in Africa, in: European Centre for 
Development Policy Management (ECDPM): ECDPM Discussion Pa-
per 269; available at: https://ecdpm.org/publications/impact-cov-
id-19-remittances-development-africa/; Cf. Sayeh/Chami (2020), 
op. cit.
increase, which would see the prospects of debt sus-
tainability deteriorate further.39
 – The terms-of-trade shock vulnerability in the Africa 
Risk Reward Index produced by the consulting compa-
ny NKC African Economics indicates that, in the event 
of a sustained economic shock, Angola, Gabon, Ethio-
pia, Ghana, Tunisia, Zambia and Kenya would be the 
most vulnerable to debt crises.40
 – The Covid-19 crisis also exposes the fragility of the 
food system. As a consequence of Covid-19, there is a 
danger of the continent falling into a devastating food 
security crisis. If trade barriers or export bans are 
adopted as well, agricultural production could shrink 
by between 2.6 and 7 per cent. Food imports would 
decline due to a combination of higher transaction 
costs and lower domestic demand. These losses are a 
result of interruptions to the trade and value chains, 
which would affect countries exporting raw materials 
and those that are more involved in value chains in 
particular. Given Africa’s dependency on food im-
ports, there is a risk of an additional 70 million people 
being unable to meet their daily food and nutritional 
needs.41
 – Corona-related restrictions have also delayed infra-
structure and construction projects and many start-
ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
throughout Africa are facing closure and job losses.
The pandemic has made us aware just how fragile and vol-
atile Africa’s economies and societies are. It highlights the 
continent’s extreme dependency on market fluctuations in 
other parts of the world, especially OECD countries and 
China, e. g. on price and demand fluctuations, financial 
flows, and decisions made outside the African continent. It 
illustrates the volatility of Africa’s integration in global sup-
ply chains and how, in these times of crisis, this can result 
in job losses and company bankruptcies. The pandemic al-
so draws attention to the fact that Africa is positioned at 
the end of supply chains and depends on market changes, 
technological change and decisions made by the big inter-
national players. Globalisation has brought to the fore just 
how little influence Africa has on financial flows (remit-
tances, investments, loans). The African continent is a pe-
ripheral region of the global economy and yet it is one that 
is particularly strongly affected by negative developments. 
The debt crisis that is about to hit so many African coun-
tries underscores just how fragile development is there. 
Moreover, the G20 and the OECD countries have already 
begun to put together reform packages that will define the 
course of African development once again, holding the le-
ver controlling financial resource allocation as they do. And 
the crisis support packages these funds will be channeled 
into are no more than those deemed problematic in the 
39 Cf. World Bank, op. cit. (9.4.2020).
40 Cf. NKC African Economics (2020): Africa Risk Reward Index; avail-
able at: https://www.africaneconomics.com/ (lasts accessed on 
22.9.2020).
41 Cf. Akiwumi, op. cit. (11.8.2020).
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1990s, albeit under a different guise.42 However, the eco-
nomic crises brought on by external events reveal that the 
international financial institutions, the G20, as well as the 
EU are overstretched. And this is primarily because their 
actions are based on »new« strategies which in fact 
strongly resemble the old and thus fail to contribute to 
economic development that is both sustainable and so-
cially acceptable.
42 IMF (2020), IMF Emergency Assistance to Africa on COVID-19: Fi-
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In recent years, the European Union and EU member states 
have developed numerous new Africa strategies. These re-
flect the challenges of cooperation in very different ways 
as well as the respective shifts in economic policy. For ex-
ample, commodity stabilisation policies were linked to the 
ideas of the New World Economic Order promoted by 
UNCTAD during the 1970s and stabilisation concepts to 
the neo-liberal ideas of the Chicago School of the 1980s 
and the policies of the Thatcher and Reagan administra-
tions, while today’s concepts are partly guided by the ideas 
of inclusive growth (pro-poor growth), redistribution of 
global inequality and sustainability agendas.
In as early as 1958, the Treaty of Rome set out the founda-
tions for postcolonial relations between the then European 
Economic Community and Africa. The subsequent 
Yaoundé, Lomé and finally Cotonou Agreement between 
the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of 
States (ACP) created close ties, for example through com-
modity price stabilisation,43 development aid, the creation 
of jointly staffed institutions, and the establishment of an 
ACP Brussels Office. Measures to promote industrialisation 
in Africa, however, were not on the agenda.
The Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 and in particular 
the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted in 2007 sig-
nalled a gradual turn in the relations between the EU and 
Africa. Up until then, the relationship had been character-
ised by postcolonial dynamics. There are four main reasons 
behind this development: Firstly, China’s strategic approach 
made it the EU’s main competitor in trade, investment and 
development cooperation. Secondly, for some 15 years al-
ready, African countries had been recording relatively high 
growth rates. Thirdly, migration from African countries to 
the EU had been on the rise as a result of conflict and crisis. 
And, fourthly, numerous new African initiatives, such as the 
African Union’s Agenda 2063 plan for the transformation of 
Africa and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) 
adopted in 2019,44 bear witness to the fact that African 
states are acting increasingly strategically and are exploring 
opportunities for cooperation with multiple actors.
43 Cf. Kappel (1996), op. cit.
44 Africa Union (2019): African Continental Free Trade Area; available 
at: https://au.int/en/cfta. (last accessed on 22.9.2020).
The JAES adopted in 2007 had already emphasised the need 
for »a move away from a traditional relationship« to »forge 
a real partnership characterized by equality«. The Juncker 
Plan – the Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment 
and Jobs45 (AEA) aimed to take the development of cooper-
ation with Africa in a new direction. China’s geostrategic 
moves acted as a catalyst for Europe to develop its own 
geostrategic concept. The AEA was ultimately replaced by 
the »Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa« (CSA) 
proposal in March 2020.46 The CSA is a European document 
which serves as a framework for talks between the EU and 
the AU. The third main agenda dedicated to a new form of 
cooperation with Africa is the External Investment Plan (EIP). 
The challenges facing EU-African relations are immense. Over 
the next ten years, the focus will be on transforming what has 
so far been paternalistic cooperation into a strategic partner-
ship. In order to achieve this, however, a number of funda-
mental decisions need to be made. EU political leaders claim 
that 2020 is »pivotal year« for the EU’s relationship with Af-
rica. The new EU-Africa Strategy adopted in March 2020 
envisages building a »stronger, more ambitious« partner-
ship with Africa. Ahead of the strategy being adopted, the 
European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen called 
for a »partnership of equals«, moving beyond the donor- 
recipient dynamics that have characterised relations be-
tween the EU and Africa for so long. Instead, the EU-Africa 
Strategy seeks to pave the way for genuine cooperation.47
The AEA was unveiled without discussions with the African 
states and includes ten action plans. The measures pro-
posed in the document include the expansion and diversi-
45 European Commission (2018): Africa-Europe Alliance. Boosting Invest-
ment and Trade for Sustainable Growth and Jobs. https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/africaeuropealliance_en (last accessed on 18.9.2020).
46 European Commission (2020): Joint Communication to the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council. Towards a Comprehensive Strat-




47 Cf. Debuysere, Loes (2020): Why the EU Should Take the Global Lead 
in Cancelling Africa’s Debt, in: Centre for European Policy Studies, 
16.4.2020; https://www.ceps.eu/why-the-eu-should-take-the-glob-
al-lead-in-cancelling-africas-debt/. Cf. Dietrich John (2020), Partner-
schaft auf Augenhöhe, 9.3.2020; Brussels: HSS, https://www.hss.de/
news/detail/partnerschaft-auf-augenhoehe-news6013/.
3
COOPERATION WITH AFRICA:  
FROM LOMÉ TO A COMPREHENSIVE 
STRATEGY WITH AFRICA 
19
COOPERATION WITH AFRICA: FROM LOMÉ TO A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY WITH AFRICA 
fication of trade between the EU and Africa, support for 
the AfCFTA through more Aid for Trade (AfT) and the im-
provement of intra- and interregional connectivity. Al-
though the AEA itself quickly disappeared from the 
discussion again, a slightly watered down version came 
back to the table in the form of the CSA. What is interest-
ing is that the AEA document is focused on economic is-
sues and develops much clearer ideas for cooperation 
between Europe and Africa than the CSA does.48 The AEA 
set itself the goal of creating ten million jobs within five 
years by increasing FDI. With the EU Investment Plan for 
third countries, which is a key component of the AEA, the 
EU has already provided 4.6 billion euros in blended fi-
nance and guarantees since 2018. These funds are aimed 
at mobilising public and private investment to the tune of 
47 billion euros. In addition to this, since 2018, EU funds 
amounting to almost 1.4 billion euros have been invested 
in measures to improve the investment climate in Africa as 
well as regulatory conditions for businesses.
Another important component of the European Africa 
Agenda was the External Investment Plan (EIP)49 which was 
launched in 2017. The objectives of the EIP are to leverage 
private finance, focus on jobs and growth, reach the poor-
est and most vulnerable, improve the investment climate, 
and encourage innovation to foster sustainable and inclu-
sive economic and social development and growth. The EIP 
also aims to create decent jobs, eradicate poverty and fos-
ter entrepreneurship. By offering investors various risk-shar-
ing products, including subsidies and guarantees, the EIP 
aims to mobilise, by 2020, a total of 44 billion euros in 
additional risk financing for projects alongside technical 
assistance and policy dialogue, both of which aim at im-
proving the business environment in African countries. The 
EU Commission is fully aware that projects in poor and 
fragile African states are chronically underfunded by the 
European Development Finance Institutions (DFIs). The 
funding shortfall is especially acute in low-income coun-
tries and fragile African states where demographics pose a 
challenge, the destruction of the environment is proceed-
ing apace, the financial markets are nascent and institu-
tions are weak.50 The EIP comprises two main components: 
(1) A guarantee mechanism for European and non-Europe-
an DFIs and private investors and (2) A »three-pillar ap-
proach« to mobilising investment based on the use of 
financial instruments (pillar 1) combined with non-financial 
technical assistance aimed at developing a pipeline of 
bankable projects (pillar 2) and improving the business en-
vironment in partner countries through policy dialogue 
(pillar 3). The financial arm of the EIP, the European Fund 
for Sustainable Development (EFSD) comprises a guarantee 
fund and blended finance facilities.
48 The nebulous content in the CSA may be related to the fact that 
the EU Commission’s document was de-prioritised by some of the 
EU Member States.
49 Cf. European Commission (2020): EU External Investment Plan; 
https://ec.europa.eu/eu-external-investment-plan/home_en.
50 Cf. Kappel/Reisen (2019), op. cit.
It would make a lot of sense for the EIP objectives to be 
included in the comprehensive package of negotiations be-
tween the EU and the African states and institutions in or-
der to improve the chances of achieving the EIP’s proposed 
objectives, i. e. financing for SMEs, the creation of better 
conditions for investment and the provision of risk capital. 
The EIP’s planned focus on low-income countries, in par-
ticular, could help create the urgently needed jobs in small-
scale industry and agriculture.
The key aims set down in the CSA are to stimulate trade 
and sustainable investment in Africa, promote reforms for 
the improvement of the business environment and invest-
ment climate, improve access to high-quality education, 
skills, research, innovation, health and social rights, and 
advance economic integration. The European Commission 
is committed to minimising the risks to the environment, 
with climate change posing a particular threat to African 
countries. The Commission outlines important aspects 
such as the circular economy, sustainable value chains and 
food systems, the promotion of renewable energy sources, 
reduction of emissions, protection of biodiversity and the 
ecosystem as well as support for green and sustainable 
models of urbanisation. In this context, the EU Commission 
emphasises the importance of the AEA for sustainable in-
vestment job creation in Africa.
Among the proposed actions in the CSA are: Action 3: 
Substantially increase environmentally, socially and finan-
cially sustainable investments that are resilient to the im-
pacts of climate change; promote investment opportunities 
by scaling up the use of innovative financing mechanisms; 
and boost regional and continental economic integration, 
particularly through the ACFTA. Action 4: Attract investors 
by supporting African states in adopting policies and regu-
latory reforms that improve the business environment and 
the investment climate, including the creation of a lev-
el-playing field for businesses. Action 5: Rapidly enhance 
learning, knowledge and skills, research and innovation 
capacities, particularly for women and youth, protecting 
and improving social rights, and eradicating child labour. 
Growth and job creation are at the heart of the CSA.
In this context, the EU Commission expressly places the is-
sue of sustainability at the centre of its growth concept for 
Africa. That said, what remains relatively unclear is how the 
climate activities are to be linked with the economic and 
social concepts (the fight against poverty and inequality). 
What is evident is that the CSA reflects the EU’s interests. 
The Comprehensive Strategy for Cooperation with Africa is 
intended to contribute to strengthening cooperation be-
tween the EU and Africa in all areas.51
51 Unlike Europe, China has jointly formulated and adopted the follow-
ing »ten major cooperation plans« with Africa, incorporating all key 
aspects of cooperation: industrialisation, modernisation of agricul-
ture, infrastructure development, financial cooperation, green devel-
opment, support for trade and investment, eradication of poverty, 
public health care, cultural and people-to-people exchange as well  
as cooperation for peace and security, cf. Abele, op. cit. 
20
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – REDEFINING EUROPE-AFRICA RELATIONS
In light of the significant challenges on the African conti-
nent, resulting from or at least exacerbated by the pan-
demic, the question arises as to what shape a future 
partnership might take and how this can contribute to 
growth, structural change, industrial and agricultural de-
velopment, economic diversification, job creation and pov-
erty reduction. Are the measures proposed by the CSA 
capable of tackling these challenges and contributing to 
inclusive and sustainable development?52
First and foremost, it is important that we learn from past 
experience. Replicating past concepts, such as the structur-
al adjustment programmes implemented by the IMF and 
the World Bank in the 1990s or the G20’s Compact with 
Africa (CwA) initiative, can neither advance transformation 
on the continent nor help eradicate asymmetries.53 The 
CwA advocated a big push agenda (i. e. a combination of 
powerful investment incentives combined with massive in-
vestment of capital in all sectors of the economy) and 
structural adjustment and stabilisation.54 The CwA aimed 
to generate higher levels of FDI through large-scale invest-
ment in infrastructure and the improvement of the eco-
nomic environment for businesses with a view to fostering 
economic growth. However, it quickly became clear that 
only a small number of investment projects were being im-
plemented under the CwA and very few jobs were being 
created. All foreign direct investment is capital intensive 
and the majority of large-scale investments barely have any 
links to local industry, albeit with certain exceptions such 
52 For a critique of the European proposals, see: Abebe, Tsion Ta-
desse / Maalim, Hafsa (2020): Refocusing the Africa-EU Strategy, in: 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS): ISS Today (27.7.2020); available 
at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/refocusing-the-africa-eu-strategy. 
The aforementioned authors identify the »overlooked African pri-
orities«: 1. Eradication of poverty: »Poverty is a leading concern«; 
2. Health: »Health is discussed as a subsidiary to other elements 
rather than a standalone sector«; 3. Transport infrastructure; 4. 
Digitalisation: »Although digital transformation is one of the pro-
posed EU priorities, internet access is not adequately addressed.«; 
5. Debt: »Debt relief as an immediate response to the short-term 
impact of the pandemic will be a litmus test for the partnership.«
53 Cf. Kappel / Reisen (2019), op. cit.
54 The CwA is coordinated by the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank and the International Finance Corporation.
as the South African automobile industry. By focusing on 
large-scale projects, the CwA tends to promote jobless 
growth more than anything else. In many countries, debt 
levels have risen, in part due to the high volume of infra-
structure investment. It would therefore be a mistake for 
the EU Commission to rely on the concept underlying the 
CwA agenda.
Europe needs to find the courage to adopt a substantially 
new Africa policy, one which also takes a reflective, 
self-critical approach to the evaluation of cooperation since 
the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. Such a shift must take 
into account that a) African countries are undergoing fun-
damental transformation and b) African countries and their 
institutions are pursuing their own agendas. To bring about 
a strategic alliance between Europe and Africa, Europe 
must analyse the dynamics on the African continent and 
global power shifts and ultimately acknowledge that c) the 
age of postcolonial cooperation is over.
In other words, it is not just about financial flows, as pro-
vided for by the EIP. Nor is it merely a matter of restructur-
ing trade, overcoming crises and the pandemic or ensuring 
good governance and good institutions. It is about a fun-
damental change of course, to which a new Africa-EU Co-
operation Pact must contribute. This would help facilitate 
joint implementation of multilateral decisions,55 on the one 
hand, while helping to balance the respective interests, on 
the other. It is about a change in direction, an end to de-
55 Cf. Maihack, Henrik / Öhm, Manfred (2020): Time for a Post-
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pendency and asymmetrical relations.56 Europe is being 
called upon to acknowledge the huge transformation 
that Africa is undergoing and to firmly press reset on co-
operation with the continent. Only if it manages to do 
this will Europe be able to continue playing an important 
role in Africa.
Europe’s strategy should be to endeavour to implement 
clear measures to reduce dominance and asymmetries and 
validate this in the forthcoming negotiations. If the EU suc-
cessfully achieves this, it would be setting European en-
gagement apart from the geostrategic actions of the USA, 
as well as China, Russia and other emerging countries. Con-
trary to all public communications and exaggerated media 
reports portraying Europe as a fading star in Africa, the EU is 
still the most important external actor on the African conti-
nent. Despite the fact that the European geopolitical agen-
da is often characterised by inadequate peacekeeping 
efforts, frequently poorly developed ad hoc measures and 
inadequate diplomatic efforts from individual governments 
and the EU as a whole (such as in the Sahel,57 Libya and 
South Africa but also in terms of migration), the EU and its 
Member States are in a better starting position – but they 
also bear more responsibility. And this is where the EU dif-
fers from the USA, which plays a more marginal role in 
Africa, or China with its suspected hegemonial intentions, 
both of which have a much smaller presence on the African 
continent and far less developed networks. The EU and the 
individual Member States have both hard power and eco-
nomic power but also employ soft power (»the European 
model«), which is something the other actors (India, Russia, 
Turkey or the Gulf states) do not even come close to achiev-
56 A great many African authors and experts have called for a fun-
damental change of course, including Vera Songwe, Carlos Lopes 
and Celestin Monga. Cf. Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi / Coulibaly, Bra-
hima Sangafowa / Thiam, Tidjane / Kaberuka, Donald / Songwe, 
Vera / Masiyiwa, Strive / Mushikiwabo, Louise / Manuel, Manual 
(2020): COVID-19 and Debt Standstill for Africa: The G-20’s Ac-
tion is an Important First Step that Must Be Complemented, Scaled 
Up, and Broadened, in: The Brookings Institution: Africa in Fo-
cus (18.4.2020); available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
africa-in-focus/2020/04/18/covid-19-and-debt-standstill-for-afri-
ca-the-g-20s-action-is-an-important-first-step-that-must-be-com-
plemented-scaled-up-and-broadened/; Cf. Lopes, Carlos (2019): 
Free Trade Area Can Break Old Europe Dependency, in: The Nor-
dic Africa Institute (21.5.2019); available at: https://nai.uu.se/
news-and-events/news/2019-05-21-carlos-lopes-free-trade-area-
can-break-old-europe-dependency.html; Monga, Célestin (2020): 
Economic Policies to Combat COVID-19 in Africa, in: Project Syndi-
cate (28.3.2020); available at: https://www.project-syndicate.org/
commentary/africa-four-ways-to-reduce-covid19-economic-impact-
by-celestin-monga-2020-03. Oqubay, Arkebe (2020): Africa’s Eco-
nomic Transformation and the Future of EU-Africa Cooperation, 
in: CESIFO Forum 21, 2: pp. 3–10; available at: www.cesifo.org/
DocDL/CESifo-forum-2020-2-july.pdf. Inge Kaul writes about the 
need for a reset, cf. Kaul, Inge (2020): Want to Take the Africa-EU 
Partnership to the Next Level? Press the Reset Button, in: CESIFO 
Forum 21, 2: pp. 16–21; available at: www.cesifo.org/DocDL/CE-
Sifo-forum-2020-2-july.pdf. Köhler, Horst (2020): Crisis and Cred-
ibility – Towards New Honesty in EU-Africa Relations. In: CESifo 
Forum21, 2: pp. (online), pp. 11–15; https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/
CESifo-Forum-2020-2-july.pdf. 
57 Cf. Tull, Denis M. (2020): German and International Crisis Manage-
ment in the Sahel: why Discussions about Sahel Policy are Going 
Around in Circles, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – SWP. 
SWP Comment 27/2020. https://doi.org/10.18449/2020C27.
ing.58 That said, the EU has to realise that by using out-of-
date strategies and failing to tackle the fundamental 
challenges here, it is in fact undermining its own position.
Irrespective of its power strategy, the EU’s approach to its 
agendas does not inspire confidence, a fact that may also be 
attributed to its lack of understanding of the dynamics at 
play on the African continent, the absence of debate on po-
tential forms of cooperation and its failure to use its own 
hard, soft and smart power strategies effectively. Urgent 
adjustments are needed here. The CSA negotiations with the 
African Union and African states as well as the negotiations 
for a successor agreement between the ACP countries and 
the EU (post-Cotonou) could provide an opportunity to agree 
on a form of strategic cooperation that improves the options 
open to the African side, while at the same time protecting 
the EU’s interests. This is a truly formidable task, one that the 
CSA does not provide sufficient scope to tackle effectively.
Discussions regarding future cooperation must therefore 
focus on the following fundamental issues: 1. Combatting 
the current pandemic crisis, 2. Promoting agriculture, 
3. Transformation policy, 4. Investment policy, 5. Trade pol-
icy and 6. Measures relating to debt relief. Rather than 
leaving the burning issues aside, the EU should be tackling 
them head on.
COMBATTING THE PANDEMIC
In March 2020, the High Representative of the EU for For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, announced 
that the EU would be supporting its partners around the 
world in fighting the virus, particularly those in Africa.59 This 
assurance was translated into real action when the EU initi-
ated its »Team Europe« package to support partner coun-
tries in the fight against the coronavirus pandemic.60 The EU 
and its Member States have taken a variety of initiatives to 
help Africa tackle the outbreak of Covid-19. These include 
immediate short-term measures such as the procurement of 
tests and laboratory equipment, followed by longer term 
pandemic prevention through the development of the labo-
ratory infrastructure, the provision of funding for training 
measures, information campaigns and national pandemic 
response plans. The EU’s support is crucial and could also 
help to strengthen Africa’s public health sector in the long 
58 On hard, soft and smart power, see: Joseph S. Nye (2011): The Fu-
ture of Power. New York: Public Affairs.
59 European Commission (2020): EU Paves the Way for a Stronger, 
More Ambitious Partnership with Africa, in: European Commis-
sion, press release (9.3.2020); available at: https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_373. See the interview 




60 Cf. Brugner, Philipp / Schuch, Klaus (2020): The EU’s Global Re-
sponse to the COVID-19 Crisis with a Focus on the Eastern 
Neighbourhood and Africa, in: Österreichische Gesellschaft für 
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term. A whole raft of African initiatives, however, likewise 
demonstrate how much African countries are taking the 
reins themselves when it comes to combatting the crisis.61 
Cooperative institutions and initiatives have emerged on the 
continent, bearing witness to a uniquely African approach to 
multilateralism, such as the collaboration between the Africa 
Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) 
which seeks to close the gap in public health systems. At 
the start of 2020, Africa had as few as six laboratories ca-
pable of testing for coronavirus. Now virtually every single 
African country has a certain level of testing capacity.62
 
NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
A common agricultural policy that serves the interests of 
both sides and involves the key African and European play-
ers must be developed in cooperation with the African 
countries. One area of focus should comprise measures to 
ensure or improve food security.63
Thanks to its extremely high productivity and billions in sub-
sidies, the European agricultural sector is superior to African 
agriculture in every respect. It is repeatedly argued that Eu-
ropean subsidies exacerbate poverty and food insecurity by 
facilitating cheap exports. The EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy operates via what is known as the »export and import 
hinge«: »If the EU, the world’s biggest exporter of agricul-
tural products, were to increase its exports, world market 
prices would fall. They may well also fall in developing coun-
tries, undermining their competitiveness and displacing local 
products«64. European agriculture receives 45 billion euros a 
year from the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EA-
GF). These funds primarily benefit farmers and food compa-
nies. In 2016, the average subsidies received by farmers 
amounted for almost 300 euros per hectare, meaning that a 
farmer with 30 hectares of land would be awarded a direct 
payment of around 10,000 euros each year. An additional 
14 billion euros comes from the European agricultural fund 
61 Cf. Moore, Jina (2020): What African Nations are Teaching 
the West about Fighting the Coronavirus, in: The New Yorker 
(15.5.2020); available at: https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/what-african-nations-are-teaching-the-west-about-fighting-
the-coronavirus.
62 Cf. Signé, Landry / Treacy, Mary (2020): Covid-19 is Accelerating 
Multilateralism in Africa, in: The Washington Post (27.7.2020); avail-
able at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/27/cov-
id-19-is-accelerating-multilateralism-africa/.
63 Cf. Rudloff, Bettina (2019): Wie kann die EU Afrikas Agrarhandel 
stärken?, in: Welthungerhilfe: Welternährung 12 / 2019; available 
at: https://www.welthungerhilfe.de/welternaehrung/rubriken/ent-
wicklungspolitik-agenda-2030/eu-handel-und-ernaehrungssicher-
heit-in-afrika/. Cf. Bisson, Loïc / Hambleton, Thea (2020): COVID-19 
Impact on West African Value Chains, in: Clingedael Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations: CRU Policy Brief; available at: 
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/covid-19-west-africa-im-
pact-value-chains. Cf. Rauch, Theo / Beckmann, Gabriele / Neubert, 
Susanne / Rettberg, Simone (2016): Rural Transformation in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Seminar für Ländliche Entwicklung, SLE Discussion 
Paper, Berlin; available at: https://doi.org/10.18452/18002.
64 Rudloff, Bettina / Brüntrup, Michael (2018): Allen Behauptungen 
zum Trotz: Die Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik hat kaum Entwicklungs-
wirkungen, in: SWP aktuell 27: Berlin: p. 1; available at: https://
www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/die-gemeinsame-agrarpoli-
tik-hat-kaum-entwicklungswirkungen/ (last accessed on 15.7.2020).
for rural development (EAFRD). This money is earmarked 
predominantly for environmental protection, climate change 
mitigation and animal welfare as well as rural development. 
These substantial direct payments have played an important 
part in the EU becoming the world’s largest exporter of 
foodstuffs. African farmers are at a significant competitive 
disadvantage in every respect due to the protectionist 
measures of the EU (and also of the USA and China).
Opinions may differ on just how much these payments 
have affected developing countries. The crux of the matter 
is, however, that these subsidies put African farmers and 
fishermen at a disadvantage and create unfair conditions. 
Moreover, high trade and transport costs along with the 
EU’s non-tariff trade barriers (as well as those imposed by 
the OECD countries and China) limit Africa’s agricultural 
exports. African governments’ lack of support for rural ar-
eas most certainly plays a significant role here. These con-
ditions reinforce the longstanding high dependence that 
Africa has had on food imports.
The CSA addresses these economic aspects which are so 
central for the African continent in very vague terms only. 
The issue of agricultural policy urgently needs to be on the 
table during the forthcoming negotiations with Africa, 
with a view to shaping a reliable regime that serves to pro-
mote African agriculture. Since the EU is very unlikely to 
fundamentally change its agricultural subsidy policy, new 
solutions must be sought that help increase the scope for 
developing a modern agricultural sector in Africa. This 
would help African countries to reduce heavily subsidised 
food imports from Europe, while increasing the export op-
portunities for African producers by improving the com-
petitive environment. The volatile nature of agricultural 
supply chains (flowers, fruit, vegetables, wine) shows how 
crucial it is to change course and focus on strengthening 
African agriculture, in other words towards exploiting the 
endogenous potential for securing supply and satisfying 
urban demand for agricultural products. 
SUPPORTING TRANSFORMATION  
PROCESSES
What is also needed is a proactive policy for economic and 
social transformation. The creation of more productive 
jobs for Africa’s rapidly growing population is of pivotal 
importance. Investment in urban agglomerations can be 
an important driver of structural change. In the cities, in 
particular, work in the informal sector constitutes the 
all-important basis of survival for the majority of the popu-
lation. The pandemic has meant that millions of people 
working in the informal economy face having their liveli-
hoods destroyed, which is something that has hit the poor-
est members of the population hardest.65 For many years, 
65 Cf. Addison, Tony / Sen, Kunal / Tarp, Finn (2020): COVID-19: Macro-
economic Dimensions in the Developing World, in: United Nations 
University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNI-
WIDER): WIDER Working Paper 43; https://www.wider.unu.edu/publi-
cation/covid-19-macroeconomic-dimensions-developing-world.
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the growth process on the African continent has led to the 
emergence of a growing middle class, although this class is 
itself volatile and could slip back into poverty.
In urban centres and in sectors that are integrated in glob-
al and regional value chains (automobile production, food 
production, horticulture, textiles, information and commu-
nications technology etc.) technology transfers and »spillo-
ver effects« can be achieved. In many countries of Africa, 
industrial concepts are being used to achieve structural 
change. Policies that enhance the complementarity be-
tween infrastructure development, foreign and domestic 
investment should be promoted by the EU to ensure inclu-
sive growth. In addition, agriculture and SMEs should be at 
the heart of strategic cooperation, as this is where millions 
of jobs will be created in the future. In fact, a modernised 
agricultural sector in Africa is instrumental in driving em-
ployment-intensive growth and improving food supply. 
LINKING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
WITH LOCAL BUSINESSES
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can make an important 
contribution to Africa’s economic development, provided it 
does not merely comprise exploiting raw materials. Invest-
ment in agriculture and the manufacturing industry, in par-
ticular, but also in the service sector can help create highly 
skilled jobs and foster technology and knowledge transfer, 
thus boosting Africa’s productivity development. In many 
of Africa’s less productive microenterprises, this form of 
investment is virtually impossible. Instead, for these enter-
prises to grow, government support initiatives are needed, 
for instance in the form of vocational training, better ac-
cess to loans and a reliable supply of electricity.
In many of the countries on the African continent, howev-
er, this support has been non-existent.66 Large-scale and 
medium-sized enterprises67 may be developing, but growth 
is sluggish, meaning they are not really in a position to 
drive Africa’s economic transformation forward on their 
own. FDI can help achieve specialisation and generate 
economies of scale. A number of foreign enterprises are 
already working in close collaboration with local business-
es, creating industrial zones, engaging in long-term pro-
jects and contributing capital, knowledge and technology. 
Fundamental change, however, must take place in Africa 
itself. In fact, the contribution that foreign direct invest-
ment has made to reducing poverty or youth unemploy-
ment has proven to be limited. Total foreign investment in 
66 See, for example, Ishengoma, Esther K. / Kappel, Robert (2011): 
Business Environment and Growth Potential of Micro and Small 
Manufacturing Enterprises in Uganda, in: African Development 
Review 23 (3): pp. 352-365. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/
abs/10.1111/j.1467-8268.2011.00291.x.
67 Cf. Kappel, Robert (2016): Von informellen Unternehmen zum  
afrikanischen Mittelstand? Differenzierungen im afrikanischen  
Unternehmertum, in: Antje Daniel et al. (eds): Afrikanische Gesell-
schaften im Wandel – Mittelschichten, Mittelklassen oder Milieus? 
Baden-Baden: Nomos: pp. 87-110; Bass / Kappel / Wohlmuth (2017), 
op. cit.
the period 2014 to 2018, for example, led to the creation 
of as few as 140,000 new jobs per year on average, pri-
marily in Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, South Africa, Nigeria, 
Algeria and Tunisia (in this order).68 Virtually the only way 
to create jobs for 20 million people per annum is through 
local businesses and farmers. And it is down to local gov-
ernments to support and foster rather than hamper their 
local economy.
The CSA underlines the importance of small and medi-
um-sized enterprises but does not indicate how these can 
be helped to grow. Likewise, there is no concrete concept 
for how to link FDI with local companies in industrial clus-
ters and specialised economic zones. Like the CwA, the CSA 
focuses on the business environment and on funding. How 
linkages can be created however, remains unclear.69 One 
possibility would be to grant tax relief for FDI that specifical-
ly subcontracts to African SMEs with a view to transferring 
technology, securing decent working conditions and carry-
ing out training measures. A programme that involves re-
search institutions and universities for example, could 
boost knowledge transfer and the development of start-up 
businesses and African small and medium-sized enterpris-
es, strengthening local businesses who can then give new 
impetus for industrialisation, develop local and regional 
value chains in agriculture and industry and create jobs. 
European support measures therefore have to be directed 
at those SMEs that have the capacity to create jobs for the 
ever growing population. Countless authors have ascer-
tained these correlations for some years now.70
68 Cf. Ernst & Young (2019), op. cit.
69 Cf. Kappel / Reisen (2019), op. cit.
70 Cf. Ishengoma, Esther K. / Kappel, Robert (2007): Linkages as De-
terminants of industrial Dynamics and Poverty Alleviation in Devel-
oping Countries, in: Dalia Dey (ed.): Informal Sector in a Globalized 
Era. Hyderabad: ICFAI University Press: pp. 89-199. Cf. Brach, Ju-
liane / Kappel, Robert (2009): Global Value Chains, Technology 
Transfer and Local Firm Upgrading in Non-OECD Countries. GIGA 
Working Paper 110. Hamburg: German Institute for Global and 
Area Studies (GIGA); available at: https://www.giga-hamburg.
de/de/publikationen/11571665-global-value-chains-technolo-
gy-transfer-local-firm-upgrading-oecd-countries/. Cf. Kappel, Rob-
ert / Pfeiffer, Birte / Reisen, Helmut (2017): Compact with Africa. 
Fostering Private Long-term Investment in Africa. DIE Discussion Pa-
per 13 / 2017. Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE); 
available at: https://www.die-gdi.de/discussion-paper/article/com-
pact-with-africa-fostering-private-long-term-investment-in-africa/. 
Cf. Farole, Thomas / Winkler, Deborah (2014): Does FDI Work for Af-
rica? Assessing Local Spillovers in a World of Global Value Chains, 




Altenburg, Tilman / Lütkenhorst, Wilfried (2015): Industrial Policy in 
Developing Countries. Failing Markets, Weak States. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited; Cf. Newman, Carol / Rand, John /
Talbot, Theodore / Tarp, Finn (2015): Technology Transfers, Foreign 
Investment and Productivity Spillovers, in: European Economic Re-
view 76, pp. 168-187; Cf. Whitfield, Lindsay / Staritz, Cornelia /
Morris, Mike (2020): Global Value Chains, Industrial Policy and Eco-
nomic Upgrading in Ethiopia’s Apparel Sector, in: Development and 
Change 51 (4): pp. 1-26.; Cf. Kweka, Josaphat / te Velde, Dirk Wil-
helm (2020): Industrial Development and Industrial Hubs. Experi-
ences in Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania, in: Arkebe Oqubay / Justin 
Yifu Lin (eds): The Oxford Handbook of Industrial Hubs and Eco-
nomic Development: pp. 985-1007.
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In a recent synthesis paper, Godart, Görg and Hanley71 set 
down three principles that are crucial in the endogenous 
growth debate. To overcome structural heterogeneity a fun-
damental change in approach is needed comprising the fol-
lowing: 1. An improved institutional environment or 
institutional quality (ease of doing business, protection of intel-
lectual property rights). This could give the growing FDI a 
boost. An improvement in the institutional environment would 
involve creating open, transparent and predictable conditions 
and regulations for enterprises. 2. Active promotion of invest-
ment, for instance through an investment promotion agency 
that supports local businesses, provides information and fos-
ters the establishment of industrial clusters. 3. Development 
of efficient specialised economic zones that could also chan-
nel spillover effects from FDI into the local economy. What 
is needed is »high-quality« FDI, i. e. foreign investment that 
helps create decent jobs that add value at the same time.72
In future the focus must be shifted to productive investment, 
training, knowledge transfer, localisation of development, 
innovation and thus integrative growth. Endogenous growth 
through industrialisation and entrepreneurial empower-
ment, both of which also create jobs, will not only foster 
growth in Africa but is in Europe’s interests, too. Europe 
could help achieve this goal by supporting the development 
of a sustainable, endogenous African economy. These meas-
ures should be given priority over investment in the raw 
materials sector and large-scale infrastructure projects.
Economic development over past few decades shines a 
spotlight on the shortcomings of global integration. The 
fact that in some sectors, African countries are dependent 
on global supply chains as well as on just-in-time produc-
tion is very much a cause for concern.73 While worldwide 
economic integration is inevitable, it might be wise for 
both Europe and Africa to ensure that this globalisation 
involves a stronger regional focus and less dependence on 
global markets.74 This would also make it possible to create 
71 Cf. Godart, Olivier / Görg, Holger / Hanley, Aoife (2020): Harnessing 
the Benefits of FDI in African Countries, in: CESifo Forum 21 (2): pp. 
32-37; available at: https://www.cesifo.org/de/publikationen/2020/
aufsatz-zeitschrift/harnessing-benefits-fdi-african-countries. 
72 Cf. Godart / Görg / Hanley (2020), op. cit.; Cf. Whitfield, Lindsay / 
Staritz, Cornelia (2020): Industrial Hubs and Technology Transfer in 
Africa’s Apparel Export Sector, in: Arkebe Oqubay / Justin Yifu Lin 
(eds): The Oxford Handbook of Industrial Hubs and Economic De-
velopment: pp. 931-949.
73 Incidentally, this also applies to new investment activities in the tex-
tile industry in Ethiopia or the automotive industry in Rwanda or 
Ghana (Volkswagen). Highly dependent on imports from South Af-
rica or Europa, the USA or China, the export production facilities 
built here neither supply local markets nor integrate local industry 
through sub-contracts or technology/knowledge transfers. Cf. Kap-
pel/Reisen (2019), op. cit.; Godart / Görg / Hanley (2020), op. cit.; 
Whitfield / Staritz (2020), op.cit.
74 Laporte, Geert (2020): Europe-Africa Relations after Corona. Brus-
sels: ECDPM / ETTG; available at: https://ettg.eu/2020/04/06/eu-
rope-africa-relations-after-corona/ (last accessed on 22.9.2020); Cf. 
Hornidge, Anna-Katharina / Michiels, Carl / Pantuliano, Sara /Tocci, 
Nathalie / Treyer, Sébastien / Laporte, Geert / Mazzara, Vera (2020): 
Towards a New Africa-Europe Partnership after the Corona Crisis, 
in: European Think Tanks Group (27.4.2020); available at: https://
www.euractiv.com/section/botswana/opinion/towards-a-new-afri-
ca-europe-partnership-after-the-corona-crisis/.
local structures that are more resilient to crisis and absorb 
the shocks of the volatilities countries are exposed to as a 
result of world market integration more effectively. This 
concept is very different to the proposals related to what is 
being dubbed »slowbalisation«.75 In my view, it is vital to 
capitalise on all the opportunities for knowledge and tech-
nology transfer, in particular through managed and con-
trolled integration into the global market.
REDEFINING TRADE RELATIONS
Up till now, trade agreements between the EU und African 
countries have not been properly regulated. In fact, the 
EU’s trade and cooperation policy has most certainly been 
partly responsible for the asymmetrical relations and exac-
erbated the debt crisis, which is now ramping up again. 
Africa has largely failed to industrialise, with no Africa-wide 
industry agenda in place to this day. African and European 
countries debated the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) over many years yet failed to come to an agree-
ment.76 To date, the EU has entered into trade agreements 
with North African countries and five Economic Partner-
ship Agreements77 with regional groups of sub-Saharan 
countries. Critics argue that these agreements might im-
pede the structural transformation of the African continent 
by undermining intra-regional trade and integration. Low-
ering tariffs on EU imports to African markets, as set down 
in the EPAs, is predicted to divert the region’s trade away 
from local suppliers towards European manufacturers. 
With the EU’s EPAs being negotiated with regional blocs as 
opposed to the African continent as a whole, they have 
increased the heterogeneity of the liberalisation commit-
ments of African countries, adding to the challenge of ra-
tionalising the African continent’s trade regimes under 
AfCFTA. The limited benefits the EPAs are expected to 
bring explain why many African countries, especially 
low-income countries, have refused to join them. The 
long-overdue reform of the trade regime between the Eu-
ropean Union and Africa requires the EPAs to be aban-
doned. Given the EU Commission’s for global markets to 
be opened up even further, African businesses and small-
holders are at an even greater risk of being marginalised by 
European imports. To be able to grow and develop com-
petitive industries and agricultural economies, African 
countries are demanding external protection that will help 
them compensate for unfavourable locational conditions.
Cooperation between the EU and the AfCFTA thus plays a 
key role here. UNECA estimates that by eliminating both 
import duties and non-tariff trade barriers, the AfCFTA has 
the potential to give a real boost to internal African trade 
within a decade. The AfCFTA, which was ratified by 54 of 
75 Cf. Laporte (2020), op. cit.
76 Cf. Blog Weltneuvermessung (15.7.2019): Afrikas Kontinentale 
Freihandelszone – Chancen und Herausforderungen; available at: 
https://weltneuvermessung.wordpress.com/2019/07/15/afrikas-kon-
tinentale-freihandelszone-chancen-und-herausforderungen-2/ Arti-
cles by Helmut Asche, Andreas Freytag and Evita Schmieg.
77 Cf. Rudloff (2019), op. cit.
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the 55 countries in Africa, seeks to ensure »free access to 
commodities, goods and services across the continent«. 
The AfCFTA is working towards removing duties on more 
than 90 per cent of goods, harmonising trade regulations 
establishing »trade corridors« to speed up the free flow of 
goods and develop the requisite infrastructure to facilitate 
cross-border trade.78
The AfCFTA measures support the development of local 
production and the procurement of more intermediate and 
finished products between African countries by reinvigor-
ating intracontinental trade and regional value chains.79 
This could give these countries easier access to food and 
medical supplies from their neighbours, shorten supply 
chains and make them less vulnerable to external shocks 
and less dependent on imports from abroad.
In light of the creation of the AfCFTA, it makes sense for 
the free trade zone to be the starting point for negotia-
tions with Europe. As part of the »Everything But Arms« 
initiative, the EU may have facilitated access to European 
markets for African exporters but, countless restrictions on 
the part of the EU remain in place. The EU would certainly 
have the scope to improve conditions for African manufac-
turers and exporters.
Non-tariff trade barriers limit Africa’s export options. A UN 
study lists how often products being exported from Afri-
ca’s poorest countries encounter non-tariff trade barriers. 
Non-tariff trade barriers may well have lessened the posi-
tive impact of low duties on African countries’ exports to 
the EU. In fact, the EU’s rules of origin are widely criticised 
for being overly complex and restrictive, especially the rules 
on minimum local content requirements and »cumula-
tion«. In other words, to be eligible for lower tariffs, an 
export from a developing country must have a minimum 
local content of 30 per cent. In addition, exporters cannot 
easily cumulate inputs from other countries. There is evi-
dence that these restrictions have limited African export-
ers’ use of tariff preferences and may also have undermined 
regional value chain creation.
Should the CSA also include trade measures and if so, to 
what extent? Given the developments outlined above, it 
makes sense to focus our attention on the following aspects:
 – Joint action on the part of the EU and the African Un-
ion is needed to devise solutions that enable African 
manufacturers to comply with EU standards and regu-
78 Cf. Schmieg, Evita (2020): Die Afrikanische Freihandelszone. Per-
spektiven für Afrika und die europäische Politik, in: Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, Berlin: SWP-Aktuell 12; available at: https://
www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2020A12/ (18.7.2020); See also 
Berger, Axel / Brandi, Clara / Stender, Frederik / Brown, Ed / Apiko, 
Philomena / Woolfrey, Sean (2020): Advancing EU-Africa Cooper-
ation in Light of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Bonn, 




79 Cf. Signé / Treacy (27.7.2020), op. cit.
lations and meet the requirements of the enterprises 
along the value chains at the same time.
 – The EU should continue to liberalise its remaining tar-
iffs on imports from Africa and reform the rules of or-
igin in order to increase the impact of these 
preferences. The European Commission should work 
towards providing tariff-free access to EU markets for 
all African countries, irrespective of the geographical 
location or income level.
 – Reform is needed to bring the EU’s rules of origin in 
line with the WTO Ministerial Declaration of the 
Least-Developed Countries. This would involve lower-
ing the minimum local content from 30 to 25 per cent 
and providing for extended cumulation. As a mini-
mum, the EU should allow African exporters to cumu-
late inputs from other countries in the region.
 – The agreement between the EU and African coun-
tries – or the AU – should centre its activities on the 
reduction of non-tariff trade barriers and actively sup-
port the development of the AfCFTA at the same time. 
After all, a bigger internal African market not only fos-
ters prosperity on the African continent but also serves 
European economic interests. Through compensatory 
measures such as the regional cohesion fund, the EU 
and individual countries in Europe could also help 
cushion the impact of the welfare losses that African 
countries suffer in the integration processes.
 – The effectiveness and impact of the EU Aid-for-Trade 
initiative (AfT) in Africa must be improved.80 The EU 
provides substantial funding to help stimulate trade in 
Africa. There is evidence that AfT can enhance trade 
performance – how effectively, however, varies con-
siderably from location to location, sector to sector 
and depending on the type of intervention. The over-
all effectiveness of this EU scheme is questionable. 
UNECA and the African Union have defined three pri-
orities for AfT in Africa: (1) to sharpen the focus of 
AfT, in particular by increasing the funding available 
for regional programmes with specific integration 
goals as well as to the poorest countries in Africa; (2) 
ensure coherence and ownership by aligning AfT pro-
grammes with Africa’s policy framework, including 
the AfCFTA; and (3) increasing the overall effective-
ness and impact of the AfT through improved moni-
toring and reporting.
SUPPORTING DIGITAL  
TRANSFORMATION 
Another important goal for African countries is the imple-
mentation of digital transformation in Africa. In the CSA, 
the EU makes a strong plea for the development of a digi-
tal single market in Africa in order to boost growth across 
all sectors of the economy. One of the most important pre-
requisites for participation in the digital transformation, 
however, is a reliable energy supply, something which is 
not guaranteed for 60 per cent of the African population. 
80 Cf. Timmis / Mitchell (16.10.2019), op. cit.
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SUPPORTING DEBT REDUCTION81
Many African countries are at high risk of debt distress.82 
Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, Africa’s growing na-
tional debt was the subject of much debate. Numerous 
experts have proposed a debt moratorium to give Africa 
leeway to overcome the pandemic crisis.83 Whether this 
moratorium would ultimately become a waiver of debt, 
however, remains unclear. With the IMF classifying 16 of 
the 36 lowest income countries in sub-Saharan Africa as 
being »in debt distress« or having a »high risk of debt dis-
tress« even before the Covid-19 outbreak, it is very likely 
that some countries will have difficulties servicing their 
debts in the near future. The decision by the G20, the IMF 
and the Paris Club to offer a temporary suspension of debt 
as part of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) 
caused quite the stir; at just 0.6 per cent of GDP, the im-
pact for Africa, however, was modest to say the least.84 
This is due to the fact that in the past 20 years African 
countries have increasingly taken on loans at commercial 
conditions from multilateral creditors (e. g. the World Bank, 
the African Development Bank), from China as well as on 
capital markets and with private creditors. In fact, African 
Eurobond debt increased ten-fold over a period of ten 
years to 58 billion US dollars (see Figure 21). Neither the 
Eurobonds nor the commercial loans are covered by the 
DSSI. The World Bank is not involved in the DSSI either, 
claiming that, in light of their net resource transfer to Afri-
can countries, it would make no sense to suspend their 
debt repayments, and that a moratorium might adversely 
impact broader poverty reduction efforts. Chinese Presi-
dent Xi Jinping, on the other hand, confirmed that China 
would be participating in the DSSI, stating that the Chinese 
government was willing to cancel the sub-Saharan coun-
tries’ interest-free debt that was due for payment in 2020. 
81 Cf. Kaiser, Jürgen: Verschuldungskrise und Coronakrise. Die sehr 
reale Gefahr der gegenseitigen Verstärkung, in: Erlassjahr Blog 
(18.3.2020); available at: https://erlassjahr.de/blog/verschuldungs-
krise-und-coronakrise-die-sehr-reale-gefahr-der-gegenseitigen-ver-
staerkung/. On Africa’s debt structure, see: World Bank (2020): 
International Debt Statistics. Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding high in-
come); available at: https://datatopics.worldbank.org/debt/ids/re-
gion/SSA; (last accessed on 26.9.2020). 
82 Cf. Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi, et al. (2020), op. cit.; for an overview 
of the countless contributions on Africa’s debt crisis, see: Proco-
pio, Maddalena (ed.): The International Politics around Africa’s Debt 
(24.7.2020), in: Italian Institute for International Political Studies 
(ISPI); available at: https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/inter-
national-politics-around-africas-debt-27020.
83 See, for example: Bolton, Patrick / Buchheit, Lee / Gourinchas, 
Pierre-Olivier / Gulati, Mitu / Hsieh, Chang-Tai / Panizza, Ugo / Weder 
di Mauro, Beatrice (2020): Necessity is the Mother of Invention: 
How to Implement a Comprehensive Debt Standstill for COVID-19 
in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (21.4.2020), in: VOX, CEPR 
Policy Portal (online); available at: https://voxeu.org/article/debt-
standstill-covid-19-low-and-middle-income-countries.
84 Cf. Pellegrini, Giulia (2020): The Evolving Nature of Africa’s Debt 
and its Sustainability, in: Italian Institute for International Political 
Studies (ISPI) (24.7.2020); available at: https://www.ispionline.it/
en/pubblicazione/evolving-nature-africas-debt-and-its-sustainabil-
ity-27016. 
According to Brautigam, Huang and Acker (2020) this 
amounts to as little as five per cent of the total debt that 
sub-Saharan countries have with China.85
The complex structure of Africa’s total debts will undoubt-
edly make any attempt to reduce the debt burden of Afri-
can countries all the more difficult. For all its positive 
effects, the debt crisis resolution by the G20, the IMF and 
the Paris Club is not enough to reduce Africa’s debt service 
by any meaningful degree. Debate over innovative solu-
tions that address Africa’s debt crisis and persistent financ-
ing gap is thus all the more important.86
Misheck Mutize87 summarises the arguments against a 
moratorium on debt as follows: 1. It is assumed that those 
countries that apply for debt service suspension have bor-
rowed irresponsibly. In future, these countries may be seen 
as high-risk and irresponsible borrowers, 2. The countries 
would be in breach of the conditions in the Eurobond con-
tracts they currently hold. The Eurobond prospectuses and 
contractual conditions do not permit countries to suspend 
debt payments as part of multilateral initiatives, 3. Many 
governments fear that a moratorium on all debt service 
would impact credit rating negatively. A lower credit rating 
would cancel out any benefits of the debt service suspen-
sion because the countries would have to pay more inter-
est on the same amount of debt, reducing their ability to 
finance budget deficits in the medium term with loans on 
global capital markets, 4. There are fears that the condi-
tions for multilateral debt relief and loan schemes will limit 
the political scope in future. A moratorium on debt service 
is granted on the provision that the funds are spent on es-
sential public services only.
In light of this, what action should the international com-
munity and the EU now take? First of all, the aim should be 
to ensure that any moratorium on debt service is only for 
those countries which are already facing a severe debt cri-
sis. Secondly, those countries that are in a position to man-
age without debt service suspension, are asked to do 
precisely so as not to lose investor confidence in future. 
Thirdly, the moratorium should also include debt with pri-
vate creditors, who should waive part of their debt pay-
ments, too. Fourthly, there are to be no bilateral debt 
rescheduling negotiations. China, the biggest lender, should 
be involved in multilateral debt talks.
85 For details, see: Brautigam / Huang / Acker (2020), op. cit
86 On this, see: proposals by Sangafowa Coulibaly, Brahima / Okon-
jo-Iweala, Ngozi / Songwe, Vera / Thiam, Tidjane / Kaberuka, Donald/ 
Manuel, Trevor / Benkhalfa, Abderrahmane / Masiyiwa, Strive (2020): 
The Unfinished Agenda of Financing Africa’s COVID-19 Response, 
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There are a number of other important measures that we 
should not lose sight of:
 – Transforming national economies to make them more 
climate compatible: The economic crisis can also be 
seen as an opportunity to take the leap towards a 
low-carbon, climate-resilient future both in Europe and 
in Africa. Economic recovery programmes are needed 
that are guided by equitable and environmentally sus-
tainable plans.88 The EU intends to support Africa’s cli-
mate change mitigation efforts through suitable 
adaptation measures, while closely monitoring social 
impacts. What these measures will entail exactly re-
mains unclear. The European Green Deal runs the risk 
of bringing about a new form of protectionism. Afri-
can countries will have to adapt to comply with Euro-
pean standards and regulations. Plans to introduce a 
carbon tax may adversely affect African exporters’ ac-
cess to the European market, essentially creating new 
obstacles in the form of non-tariff trade barriers.89 The 
climate action proposals made by the EU therefore re-
quire further deliberation.
 – Solutions are needed to help curb illegal trade: For the 
EU and Africa, the current crisis may well be a wake-up 
call – a call for the EU to actively join African countries 
in the fight against illicit financial flows.90 In the past 
two decades, Africa has lost 1.3 trillion US dollars to 
illicit flows abroad. While Africa works on stemming 
these illicit financial flows, the world community 
must increase its efforts to repatriate financial trans-
fers. It is time for the EU to nail its colours to the mast 
and take action.
 – Combatting tax evasion by multinationals, which the 
UN Economic Commission for Africa puts at as much 
as 100 billion US dollars per year.
88 Cf. Hornidge et al. (27.4.2020), op. cit. 
89 »Africa is not opposed to green and climate-friendly economic re-
forms, but it is worried that the ambitious European Green Deal 
will create a new type of protectionism by imposing new non-tar-
iff barriers, such as the carbon border tax that may affect access 
to the European markets.« Geert Laporte (2020): The AU-EU Sum-
mit Didn’t Prove Immune to COVID-19 – but that May be a Blessing 
in Disguise. Brussels: ETTP (15.9.2020); available at: https://ecdpm.
org/talking-points/au-eu-summit-not-immune-covid-19-blessing-
disguise/.
90 Signé, Landry / Sow, Mariama / Madden, Payce (2020): Illicit Finan-
cial Flows in Africa: Drivers, Destinations, and Policy Options, in: Af-
rica Growth Initiative at Brookings: Policy Brief (2.3.2020); available 
at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/illicit-financial-flows-in-af-
rica-drivers-destinations-and-policy-options/. Cf. Ostheimer, An-
drea Ellen (2015): Illicit Financial Flows als Entwicklungshindernis, 
in: KAS Auslandsinformationen 9; available at: https://www.kas.de/
de/web/auslandsinformationen/artikel/detail/-/content/illicit-finan-
cial-flows-als-entwicklungshindernis (last accessed on 20.5.2020).
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The EU will need to learn to anticipate where the great 
transformation in Africa is heading. In some key areas, the 
CSA is not up to dealing with the challenges ahead. The 
concept behind the CSA is a continuation of what we are 
already familiar with, which is why it is ill-suited to pave the 
way for a new form of cooperation between Europe and 
Africa, having little impact on the old asymmetries. This 
will ultimately cause some countries in Africa to turn their 
back on Europe even more.
The EU and European governments should use their 
prominent position to press reset on relations with Africa. 
There is a particular need for steering in various policy 
areas. Africa’s transformation is progressing quickly, with 
new growth potential for local businesses emerging in 
the urban centres. It is time for European investors to say 
goodbye to a model based purely on exports and cheap 
labour and instead focus on integrating the local busi-
nesses, transferring technology and knowledge, and cre-
ating jobs, in doing so aiding the growth of the middle 
classes and African small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Fostering these trends would also be beneficial to Euro-
pean investors. After all, the expansion of the markets 
resulting from increased prosperity is very much in Eu-
rope’s interests. If this were also to help integrate agricul-
ture and rural areas – where the majority of Africans and 
the poor live – European actors would be making an im-
portant and much needed contribution to endogenous 
growth. Active support for the development of the AfCFTA 
can also play a role in achieving this goal. Especially in the 
development of links between foreign investment and lo-
cal enterprises (be it in the agricultural, industrial or ser-
vice sector) there is a wealth of untapped potential that 
the EU can and indeed should unlock in the negotiations 
for a new strategy.
Africa’s postcolonial days are over, with African countries 
increasingly distancing themselves from the donor-recipi-
ent model. They have established the AfCFTA and are forg-
ing stronger intraregional partnerships once again, enabling 
them to follow their very own path of development and 
growth. They have industrialised and developed agricultur-
al strategies. They are far less dependent on foreign re-
sources and external economic activities on the part of the 
US, the EU or China than some of the press and statements 
by the aid industry would have us believe. Africa’s develop-
ment is endogenous. This is the conclusion drawn by the 
key works on growth economics from the past few dec-
ades.91
Globalisation has given the African continent opportuni-
ties to play a role in the international division of labour. 
Concepts based on pure world market integration, how-
ever, have not been as successful as hoped. As to the 
»dissociation« strategies such as those pursued in Tanza-
nia, Ethiopia or Ghana during the 1960s and 1970s, these 
have failed entirely. The result was widespread poverty 
and unemployment. The Covid-19 pandemic has only ex-
acerbated the poverty, hunger, climate risks and inequal-
ity. The climate catastrophe is hitting Africa especially 
hard, despite the fact that the main contributors are the 
USA, EU and China whose economic model does not fo-
cus on sustainability.
What is essential here is measures that will be instrumental 
in reducing asymmetry, setting the course for the current 
transformation process and shifting the focus to four key 
areas: local added value through value chains; a focus on 
employment-intensive investment in agriculture, industry 
and the service sector and corresponding investment in-
centive systems; promotion of AfCFTA; and climate change 
mitigation measures.
This analysis shows that the CSA is not making significant 
headway in the direction of a new era of African-EU rela-
tions. The plan has to be reviewed and overhauled by the 
EU and the AU – not only against the background of the 
effects of the Covid-19 pandemic but also, and indeed 
more importantly, with a view to reducing the asymmetri-
cal dependence and power relations. The question of how 
climate agendas can be linked coherently to economic and 
social concepts is one that must be addressed urgently. 
91 See, for example: Rodrik, Dani (1999): Making Openness Work: The 
New Global Economy and the Developing Countries. Washington, 
D. C.: Overseas Development Council; Cf. Krugman, Paul (1996):  
Development, Geography, and Economic Theory. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT press; Cf. Elsenhans, Hartmut (1991): Development and 
Underdevelopment. The History, Economics, and Politics of North-
South Relations. New York: Sage Publications; Cf. Senghaas, Dieter 
(1982): Von Europa lernen. Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtun-
gen. Frankfurt / Main: Edition Suhrkamp; Cf. Hirschman, Albert O. 
(1958): The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.
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The coronavirus crisis is a unique incentive for Africa and 
Europe to break with outdated concepts and the power 
relations of the past. A prosperous African continent is in 
the interests of the EU. Any future cooperation must there-
fore be based on fairness, equality, solidarity, climate-com-
patibility and civility. The EU’s interest in cooperating with 
Africa should not wane during the Covid-19 crisis. On the 
contrary, Europe should be tapping into the potential to 
forge collaborative partnerships.
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The European Union‘s relations with 
the African continent are facing a dis-
tinct set of challenges. Contrary to 
expectations, the pending negotia-
tions between the partners are now 
being put to the test like never before. 
The global spread of Covid-19 has led 
to economic crises throughout the 
world – and the African continent is 
no exception. This new economic cri-
sis also impacts Europe’s relations 
with Africa. There is a significant risk 
that Africa-Europe relations will not 
attract as much interest as other glob-
al developments, with the USA, Eu-
rope and China too busy dealing with 
their own challenges.
For more information, see:
https://www.fes.de/en/together-towards-justainability
The EU will need to learn to anticipate 
where the great transformation in Afri-
ca is heading. In some key areas, the 
EU-Africa strategy »Towards a Compre-
hensive Strategy with Africa« (CSA) is 
not up to dealing with the challenges 
ahead. The concept behind the CSA is 
a continuation of what we are already 
familiar with, which is why it is ill-suited 
to pave the way for a new form of co-
operation between Europe and Africa, 
having little impact on the old asym-
metries. This will ultimately cause some 
countries in Africa to turn their back on 
Europe even more. The EU and Euro-
pean governments should use their 
prominent position to press reset on 
relations with Africa. None of the 
measures taken to date, e. g. the Exter-
nal Investment Plan, have succeeded in 
creating a more balanced partnership 
between Europe and Africa.
The Covid-19 pandemic induced eco-
nomic crisis has shown that the pre-
vailing asymmetry in the relations 
between Europe and Africa is no 
longer acceptable as we move into 
the future. Now is the time for both 
sides to work together on finalising 
the much-needed reform packages. 
To pave the way for these reforms, the 
EU Commission’s plans for negotia-
tions on future cooperation must be 
overhauled, particularly in relation to 
trade and economic relations, value 
chain integration, and the focus on 
job creation and poverty alleviation. 
Last but not least, cooperation on the 
issue of sustainability must be adjust-
ed, especially against the backdrop of 
the climate catastrophe, which, be-
sides hindering growth and causing 
job losses, poses a threat to agricul-
ture and food supply on the African 
continent.
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